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Executive Summary
The UK will leave the European Union on 31 January 2020. 
Negotiators and commentators have spent more than three 
years discussing the terms on which the UK will withdraw, 
but comparatively little attention has been paid to the future 
relationship between the UK and the EU after Brexit at a 
sectoral level. Withdrawing is merely the first stage of the 
process, and the UK and the EU will soon begin to think 
about negotiating a new relationship and decide which 
issues to prioritise.
Research and innovation is one of the key areas in which 
the UK and the EU will need to establish a post-Brexit 
relationship. Over the past two decades, the UK and the  
EU have been at the forefront of that enterprise through  
the development of the European Research Area (ERA). 
Together, European nations have created a world-leading 
research base. Six of the world’s top twenty universities are 
in the ERA, and Europe produces a third of the world’s 
scientific publications with just 7% of the global population. 
A new post-Brexit relationship on research and innovation 
will need to be negotiated to ensure we sustain and  
grow this valuable and mutually beneficial partnership. 
Research and innovation are critical to achieving lasting 
competitiveness and economic development, especially 
with the dominance of the USA and the rising challenge  
of China in this field. An early agreement providing for 
cooperation on research and innovation would reflect the 
economic and social importance of research and innovation 
to the people of the UK and the EU. 
This report sets out what the Wellcome Trust and Bruegel 
have learned from a project to simulate a negotiation 
process between the UK and EU to create a post-Brexit 
research and innovation agreement. Our negotiating 
scenario assumed that the UK had left the EU with a 
withdrawal agreement, and that the negotiation was  
taking place during a ‘standstill’ transition period.
Our exercise demonstrated that it is possible to reach 
agreement among experts on the terms of an EU-UK 
research and innovation deal. However, the project also 
revealed that some elements of an agreement may be 
harder to negotiate than expected. A shared purpose and 
belief in the importance of research and innovation is not 
enough to see a deal come to fruition. It is also necessary 
to overcome a number of political and technical challenges 
that are spelled out in this report. The process must  
start now to ensure an agreement is reached as soon as 
possible. We hope that this report will provide inspiration 
and guidance for that process. 
Our simulated negotiation highlighted specific areas for 
attention that we hope will create a roadmap for UK and EU 
post-Brexit discussions:
•  UK association to Horizon Europe1 needs to be a 
core part of a research and innovation agreement, 
and this would be a win-win for the UK and the EU. 
Both parties in our exercise wanted UK inclusion in  
all parts of Horizon Europe to be the default option.  
The teams hoped this would keep cooperation between 
the UK and EU as close as possible to its current levels
•  The EU moving away from its historical GDP-based 
financial formula could make it easier for the UK to 
agree terms, as would the inclusion of a “correction 
mechanism” designed to address any “significant 
imbalance” between what an Associated Country pays 
in and the money it receives. This should reassure the 
UK that it will get value for money. Our teams reached 
an agreement based on the UK ‘paying its way’, 
including a contribution towards the running costs  
of the programme
•  Suitable precedent was found to provide the UK 
with an appropriate degree of influence over the 
Horizon Europe programme, without needing to grant 
the UK formal voting rights. It was agreed that UK 
participation in the programme would mean accepting 
Court of Justice of the European Union and European 
Court of Auditors’ jurisdiction in this area
•  Arrangements to facilitate the exchange of research 
workers and their direct families are essential to a 
research and innovation agreement. Our negotiating 
teams were able to agree suitable wording on this 
issue, albeit through a commitment to establishing 
“reciprocal” and “favourable” arrangements rather than 
attempting to detail a specific system for achieving this 
•  Finding suitable wording that reflected both  
teams’ views on common standards was difficult. 
The UK team sought to preserve UK sovereignty  
while recognising the practical benefits of common 
standards for research purposes. The EU team aimed 
to ensure high standards in the UK after leaving the EU. 
Wording on adopting regulatory approaches that were 
“compatible to the extent possible” was agreed, based 
on similar text in the October 2019 Political Declaration 
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•  Due to its importance to research, the teams also 
agreed a backstop mechanism for the sharing  
of personal data. Facilitating the free flow of data  
for research was felt to be an essential part of an 
agreement, but the teams hoped that this could be 
superseded by a broader post-Brexit decision by  
the EU on the adequacy of the UK’s data protection 
arrangements. 
Our negotiation process explored a research and innovation 
agreement separately from broader political issues. This 
focused our work, but we sought to keep wider political 
issues and pressures in mind. Researchers are mainly 
influenced by the need for continuity in cooperation to 
maintain world-class performance on both sides of the 
Channel. Politicians and officials, however, will also be 
influenced by concerns over sovereignty, the unity of the 
EU’s single market, and the autonomy of decision-making, 
as well as the parameters of the broader post-Brexit 
relationship between the two parties. Given our starting 
point, it is therefore likely that our process reached a 
post-Brexit agreement more readily than officials or 
politicians might.
Several of the most important issues for research and 
innovation overlap with these broader political discussions 
– for example, researcher mobility and common standards. 
Discussion of such issues as part of a research and 
innovation agreement would intersect with negotiations  
on the overall future relationship between the EU and UK, 
adding a significant layer of complexity to the process. 
The UK and EU have two main options: either wait for  
the future overall shape of their relationship to be agreed 
first or pursue without delay a standalone research and 
innovation agreement. 
With Horizon Europe due to begin on 1 January 2021, there 
is a significant risk that a research and innovation agreement 
will not be in place in time for the start of the programme. 
Delaying negotiations until after an overall EU-UK future 
framework has been agreed would increase this risk.  
The legislation establishing Horizon Europe is still being 
negotiated within the EU institutions, and countries wishing 
to associate cannot formally start the process until the 
legislation is in place. This will create further time pressures.
Any discontinuity in the UK’s participation in Horizon 2020, 
the existing Framework Programme, or Horizon Europe,  
its successor, would be highly damaging to research and 
innovation in the UK and the EU. Our exercise suggests 
that the UK government and the European Commission 
must start work on a research and innovation agreement  
as soon as possible, and that this should be a priority. 
A standalone research and innovation agreement 
represents the best chance of the UK fully participating  
in Horizon Europe from the start of the programme.  
The intersection with wider political discussions will  
be difficult to manage, but our exercise suggests that 
compromises could be found. 
The scenario for our simulation optimistically assumed that 
the UK had left the EU with a withdrawal agreement in 
place. However, a no-deal Brexit would make the task of 
negotiating a research and innovation agreement even more 
difficult. If the UK were to leave the EU without a withdrawal 
agreement, the current win-win approach of experts on  
the two sides would be lost and negotiations would start 
against a background of tensions rather than goodwill. 
Research and innovation would then be caught up in the 
political impasse created by a no-deal exit, making it less 
likely that the UK will be a full participant in Horizon Europe 
from day one of the programme. The UK and EU should 
strive to avoid such an outcome.
Dr Michael Leigh, Project Facilitator
Dr Beth Thompson, UK team lead
Professor Reinhilde Veugelers, EU team lead
January 2020 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction
This chapter of our report explains the background to our 
project and sets out why there is a need to explore what a 
post-Brexit agreement on research and innovation would 
look like. We also explain our objectives for the project 
and the limitations of the exercise.
Background
The UK will leave the European Union on 31 January 2020. 
Negotiators and commentators have spent more than three 
years discussing the terms on which the UK will withdraw, 
but comparatively little attention has been paid to the future 
relationship between the UK and the EU after Brexit at a 
sectoral level. Withdrawing is merely the first stage of the 
process, and the UK and the EU will soon begin to think 
about negotiating a new relationship and decide which 
issues to prioritise.
Research and innovation is one of the key areas in which 
the UK and the EU will need to establish a post-Brexit 
relationship. This report sets out what the Wellcome Trust 
and Bruegel have learned from a project to simulate a 
negotiation process between the UK and EU to create a 
post-Brexit research and innovation agreement.
The importance of a post-Brexit research  
and innovation agreement
The UK and the EU have a rich history of scientific 
cooperation. Together, European countries have created a 
world-leading location for research and innovation. Six of the 
world’s top 20 universities are in the European Research Area 
(ERA), and Europe produces a third of the world’s scientific 
publications with just 7% of the global population.2,3,4 
EU-UK cooperation is key to this success: 60% of the UK’s 
internationally co-authored papers are with EU partners.5 
Thirteen of the UK’s top 20 ‘most collaborated with’ 
countries are EU Member States.6 Cooperation with the  
EU is also associated with exceptional performance. 
Collectively, University College London (UCL), Imperial 
College London, Oxford University and Cambridge University 
publish about one-quarter of the UK’s research output,  
and their collaboration with EU partners is greater than for 
UK universities overall, at 35% of the total publications in 
2016 (compared to a UK average of 31%).7 The 2013  
Nobel Prize in Physics was shared between Peter Higgs,  
a British researcher, and François Englert, a Belgian 
researcher, whose fundamental work was confirmed through 
experiments at CERN’s Large Hadron Collider in Switzerland.
Science is important for the future prosperity of the EU, the 
UK and Europe as a whole. Research is key to ensuring that 
the UN Sustainable Development Goals are met, including  
in addressing the challenge of climate change. Advances  
in science and engineering are needed to transition  
from combustion engines to electric vehicles and to  
enhance energy storage capabilities. Developing a better 
understanding of how the planet is changing will also be 
vital, including forecasting rises in sea levels, understanding 
impacts on biodiversity, identifying extreme weather patterns 
and understanding the implications for health. For all of this, 
advances in research and innovation will be essential.8 
Cooperation on research is even more important in the light 
of growing international competition. China is building up  
its global competitiveness in knowledge-intensive sectors 
and aims to be a global leader in science and innovation by 
2050. China outperforms the European Union in terms of 
expenditure on research and development as a share of  
its GDP, and already produces about the same number of 
scientific publications, and more PhDs in natural sciences 
and engineering, than the United States9. 
World-leading research and innovation capacity is also 
critical to achieving lasting economic development. 
According to research by the European Commission, for 
every €1 spent in Framework Programme 7 (one of a series 
of EU funding programmes on research and innovation),  
the direct and indirect economic effects through 
innovations, new technologies, and products is €11. 
More broadly, evidence shows that international 
cooperation makes science stronger. Analysis of the most 
highly cited research publications shows citation rates 
increase when the UK and EU collaborate, compared  
to papers published without the other partner. Even a 
temporary pause in cooperation between the UK and  
the EU would be damaging to both parties.
Our project
Wellcome has argued previously that there is a need for  
a post-Brexit agreement on research and innovation,  
either as a chapter within an overall EU-UK agreement 
defining future relations or as a standalone science deal.12 
Many in the research community assume that agreeing  
the terms of a science deal is likely to be relatively 
straightforward, since the interests of the UK and EU  
are well-aligned in this area. However, this assumption  
has not yet been tested.
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Previous work in this area has focused on what ‘the 
research community’ across the UK and the EU sees as 
being important, based on scientific needs. For example, 
Wellcome’s Future Partnership Project with the Royal 
Society consulted individuals and organisations across 
Europe to identify the key themes that a research and 
innovation agreement would need to encompass, and it 
brought researchers together to explore the results.  
Key issues were access to EU Framework Programmes, 
cooperation on pre-competitive regulation, and facilitating 
the movement of people; these are summarised in 
Wellcome’s ‘Brexit and Beyond’ report.13 
Wellcome and Bruegel came together in summer 2019  
to take this previous work to the next level. Using the 
themes previously identified as important to research,  
we introduced the dynamics of a negotiation between the 
two sides to explore what could realistically be agreed in 
this area. By focusing on the objective of producing the  
text of an agreement, we sought to explore: 
•  whether the win-win nature of the negotiation  
led naturally to an agreed text;
•  what the UK and EU teams considered to be their 
priorities and negotiating objectives; and 
•  which themes led most swiftly to agreement and  
which issues required greater negotiation and  
ingenuity to resolve.
Our work was designed to inform the UK government and 
the European Commission’s prioritisation of issues after 
Brexit. Once the UK has left the EU, a broad range of 
negotiations will need to take place to determine the future 
relationship, as laid out in the draft Political Declaration.  
We hope that our work will help define the place of research 
and innovation in that process, especially considering  
the importance of reaching agreement before the start  
of Horizon Europe on 1 January 2021. 
What is Horizon Europe?
The research and innovation agreement negotiated in 
this exercise placed association to Horizon Europe at 
the heart of the agreement. Horizon Europe is the  
EU’s ambitious €100 billion research and innovation 
programme that will run from 2021–2027. The 
programme aims to strengthen European science  
and technology research, boost innovation capacity, 
competitiveness and jobs, and deliver on citizens’ 
priorities. Horizon Europe will also address global 
challenges – including climate change, food security, 
and cancer. The Commission has made its proposal 
for Horizon Europe and is currently in negation with 
The Council of the European Union and the European 
Parliament.
Horizon Europe is the ninth Framework Programme 
for research and will be the successor to the current 
programme, Horizon 2020. 
‘Association’ vs ‘Third Country’ status
The legislation for Horizon 2020 allows non-Member 
States to participate either as an ‘Associated Country’ 
or as an ‘industrialised third country’, and it is 
expected that Horizon Europe will operate on  
a similar basis. 
Associated countries participate in all parts of 
Framework Programmes through a dedicated 
association agreement. Organisations and researchers 
from Associated Countries have a similar status to 
those from EU Member States and can participate 
under the same conditions. The variety of existing 
models of association reflects the diversity of 
countries involved – for example, the agreement  
with Israel does not include freedom of movement  
or regulatory alignment. On the other hand, as a 
European Economic Area (EEA) member, Norway is in 
the EU single market and signed up to free movement 
of people. 
Association to the Framework Programmes through 
an agreement should not be confused with the much 
broader ‘Association Agreements’ that the EU has 
with some countries, which set out economic and 
political cooperation in areas of mutual interest.
Industrialised third countries can only participate in 
some parts of the Framework Programmes. If the  
UK were a third country for the purposes of Horizon 
2020, it would not be able to participate in the 
European Research Council and Marie Skłodowska-
Curie Actions programmes, and would have no 
access to funding for industrial partnerships and 
collaborations. UK researchers would also be 
restricted from leading projects funded through  
the Framework Programme.
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The UK and EU’s shared intention to create  
a research and innovation agreement
Encouragingly, the British government and the European 
Commission have both expressed interest in ensuring that 
cooperation on research and innovation continues smoothly 
after Brexit. 
In its “report of the independent High Level Group on 
maximising the impact of EU Research & Innovation 
Programmes”, the Directorate-General for Research and 
Innovation recommended that: 
Whatever Brexit modalities are agreed between the UK and 
the EU by 2019, full and continued engagement with the  
UK within the post-2020 EU R&I programme remains an 
obvious win-win for the UK and the EU. The UK has one  
of the strongest science bases of all European countries.  
A positive cooperation model (e.g., based on mutual 
investment) should be established, so that the UK remains 
part of the European Research Area.14 
The current draft Political Declaration (October 2019)  
on the UK and EU’s future relationship includes an  
agreed expression of intention to cooperate on research 
and innovation:
•  Noting the intended breadth and depth of the future 
relationship and the close bond between their citizens, 
the Parties will establish general principles, terms and 
conditions for the United Kingdom’s participation in 
Union programmes, subject to the conditions set out 
in the corresponding Union instruments, in areas such 
as science and innovation […]
•  The Parties should engage in dialogue and exchanges 
in areas of shared interest, with the view to identifying 
opportunities to cooperate, share best practice and 
expertise, and act together, including in areas such as 
culture, education, science and innovation. In these 
areas, the Parties recognise the importance of 
mobility and temporary movement of objects and 
equipment in enabling cooperation. […]
•  The Parties agree to consider conditions for entry and 
stay for purposes such as research, study, training and 
youth exchanges.15 
The political will for a post-Brexit research and innovation 
agreement clearly exists. This would be of mutual benefit to 
the UK and the EU. The focus for our project was to identify 
what this might look like in practice.
Project limitations
Our project, and therefore the draft agreement text  
itself, was limited in a number of ways which should  
be acknowledged and understood:
•  Our negotiation process was run over three sessions 
– a real negotiation is likely to take much longer than 
this. This meant the scope of the exercise was limited 
to a small set of key issues
•  Several adjacent issues that were felt to be important 
to both teams – such as UK participation in the 
Erasmus Programme and Euratom – were not dealt 
with in detail but will need to be addressed fully in the 
real negotiations
•  We did not devote time to exploring the specifics of 
access to the many different research infrastructures  
in the UK and EU. Those that are not covered by the 
Framework Programmes directly have their own 
individual legal basis and would require dedicated 
attention
•  The focus of our work was primarily on research rather 
than innovation, and there are likely to be additional 
areas of interest in a research and innovation 
agreement that we have not considered. The teams we 
assembled had expertise in academic research in 
particular. In the limited time we set for our exercise, we 
prioritised issues relating to academic research, and 
many of these will be relevant to innovation (including 
association to the whole of Horizon Europe). This 
should not be interpreted as suggesting that other 
innovation elements of a research and innovation deal 
are any less important than those relating to research
•  While the agreement produced is presented in a formal 
legal style, the focus of the project was the negotiation 
itself rather than ensuring that the text of the agreement 
is legally robust
•  The project explored the feasibility of a research and 
innovation agreement separately from the far more 
complex question of the overall future relationship 
between the EU and the UK. The assumption that it is 
possible to consider research and innovation separately 
may not be confirmed in practice, particularly if the EU 
and UK work on the basis that “nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed”16
•  Participants were drawn primarily from the research 
community, with the inclusion of a small number of 
former senior officials and others to provide political 
insight. This may have tilted the outcome towards 
cooperation rather than confrontation. Actual 
negotiations may well be more politically challenging
•  We asked our participants to assume that the 
negotiation was taking place in a cooperative 
environment, and that sufficient time had passed for 
the manner in which the UK withdrew from the EU not 
to impinge on the negotiations. This may not prove to 
be the case, and we explore this question further in 
Chapter 4
•  While we aimed to inject a degree of political realism 
into the simulated negotiation, the agreement produced 
is not intended to be a prediction of what might occur. 
Rather it is a demonstration that agreement is possible, 
and a way of identifying the main challenging issues. 
The extent to which our agreement might be politically 
acceptable is explored in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2:  
Our simulated negotiation process 
EU negotiation team
UK negotiation team
In this chapter we set out the process we used for  
our project, including the scenario we adopted, the 
composition of the negotiating teams, and an overview 
of the dynamics of the process as the simulation was 
conducted. We explain below how existing precedents 
were used to provide a structure for the agreement, and 
conclude with some reflections from the participants.
The teams 
The teams comprised researchers alongside individuals with 
experience of working within or with the European Union,  
to create groups that would bring a degree of political reality 
alongside an understanding of the needs of research and 
innovation. We asked the teams to combine the scientific 
community’s desire for a deal with a realistic assessment of 
what each side could offer and accept, and to bear in mind 
how any compromises could be sold to the UK government 
or the Commission and the EU. However, we did not ask the 
participants to adopt specific named ‘roles’ or identities to 
mirror the real negotiation environment, nor did we attempt 
to ‘war game’ their responses to any simulated ‘political 
events’ during the process.
Over the course of the project the following participants 
contributed to their respective teams:
Name Position/Affiliation
Reinhilde Veugelers EU team lead. Senior fellow at Bruegel. Full professor at KU Leuven in Department of Management, Strategy and Innovation
Alessandro Damiani President of APRE, the Italian Agency for the Promotion of European Research
Marga Gual Soler Science Diplomacy Consultant, Founder & Director, SciDip GLOBAL. Member of the Research, Innovation, and Science Experts Group (RISE) to former European Commissioner Carlos Moedas
Debarati Guha Director of the Centre for Research and Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)
Mark Hallerberg Non-Resident Fellow, Bruegel
Martin Mueller Executive Director Academic Forum, Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator
Karin Sipido Professor of Medicine and Head of Experimental Cardiology at KU Leuven, University of Leuven
Luc Soete Rector Magnificus and professor of International Economic Relations at the School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University
Annika Thies Director of the Brussels office, Helmholtz Association
Jan Truszczyński Former Director-General of Education and Culture of the European Commission (Appointed 2009)
Name Position/Affiliation
Beth Thompson UK Team Lead and Head of UK and EU Policy and Advocacy, Wellcome Trust
Eilis Ferran Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Institutional and International Relations), University of Cambridge
Clare Moody Member of the European Parliament for South West England, 2014–19
Andrew Scott Professor of European Union Studies at the University of Edinburgh Law School
Uta Staiger Pro-Vice-Provost Europe and Executive Director, UCL European Institute
Janet Thornton Director Emeritus of EMBL-EBI and Senior Scientist
Paolo Vineis Chair in Environmental Epidemiology, MRC-PHE Centre for Environment and Health, Imperial College London
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The scenario 
A hypothetical scenario was constructed to try and move 
the participants away from the current political uncertainty 
around the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and focus instead 
on what a future relationship between the two parties might 
entail. The main premise of the scenario was that the UK 
left the EU in late 2019, or early 2020, and that the ‘dust 
had settled’ following its departure.
We asked participants to assume that the UK had left  
the EU with a withdrawal agreement in place and that a 
transition period had followed. However, it is possible  
that reality may diverge from this scenario, as the risk of a 
no-deal Brexit remains in play. At the end of our negotiation 
process we asked the participants to reflect on how a 
no-deal withdrawal would have affected our exercise. 
Comments from participants are assembled in Chapter 4. 
They provide some clear messages on the need to avoid 
this outcome and the effect this would have on the 
prospects of securing a timely post-Brexit research  
and innovation deal. 
The negotiation structure 
The simulated negotiation took place over three face-to-
face meetings in Brussels and London, with additional team 
meetings and bilateral contact between individuals on an  
ad hoc basis. The meetings were overseen by a project 
facilitator, Dr Michael Leigh, Academic Director, European 
Public Policy, Johns Hopkins University, School of 
Advanced International Studies, Bologna, Italy. Dr Leigh’s 
experience as a former senior European Commission 
official helped us to ensure that the exercise ran smoothly 
and was informed by the process of real EU negotiations. 
He offered his advice and expertise to both teams, while 
also acting as chair for the meetings and keeping the 
negotiations moving forward.
The project began with a scoping meeting in Brussels – an 
initial opportunity for the teams to meet, both separately 
and together, set out their broad expectations for the 
project, and determine what issues should be included in 
the negotiation process. At this early stage, agreement in 
some areas was already reached. Where agreement could 
not be reached, each team designated a person to lead on 
that issue in discussion with their counterpart from the 
other team.
The teams met again separately in the following weeks and 
bilateral communication began. The Bruegel and Wellcome 
secretariat produced a first draft text – using each team’s 
opening positions and current Horizon 2020 association 
agreements as a template. The draft agreement contained 
elements of standard text which were unlikely to be 
controversial, areas where broad agreement had already been 
reached, and key areas where further negotiation was needed. 
The main face-to-face negotiation took place on  
17 September 2019. This meeting was structured to allow 
back-and-forth negotiation sessions and separate team 
meetings, with the aim of reaching final agreement on  
all outstanding issues. Progress was made but no final 
agreement could be reached. It was, therefore, decided  
that a final negotiation session would be needed, and 
offline negotiations between team members would continue 
in the meantime. 
The final negotiation session was held in London on 11 
October 2019, where agreement on the text of a deal was 
reached. The text of the deal is appended to this report, 
and Chapter 3 provides an explanation of how the wording 
was arrived at.
Our use of existing precedents
Much of the text in the agreement produced by this process 
is based on text from existing Horizon 2020 association 
agreements – particularly those for Norway, Switzerland, 
Israel, Ukraine and the Faroe Islands. We focused 
specifically on the precedents of the Horizon 2020 
agreements as these provided the level of specificity 
needed and reflected the negotiating teams’ focus on 
associating to Horizon Europe as a core component. 
The EU also has a range of bilateral science and technology 
agreements with other countries that do not include 
association to the Framework Programmes. For instance, 
with the USA, Japan and Mexico. The EU can also include 
science cooperation as part of wider free-trade agreements. 
For example, CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership 
Agreement.17
These agreements are generally more aspirational in tone, 
setting out broad areas for cooperation. For example, 
promoting visits and exchanges, sharing information,  
and setting up joint projects, workshops and conferences.18 
The agreement we produced includes elements of this  
more aspirational wording (e.g. Article 4). This was included 
to ensure cooperation between the UK and EU was not 
confined to the Framework Programmes and should be 
expanded wherever possible. 
Using existing precedents, particularly those from Horizon 
2020 association agreements, gave a starting point to  
this project and provided guidance to the participants. 
However, deviation from existing precedents may be 
justified considering the size of the UK and the fact it is 
already a significant partner to the EU in research and 
innovation. The Brexit situation itself is unprecedented, 
which calls for creativity and flexibility on all sides.
The text agreed through our process diverges from existing 
Horizon 2020 association agreements in various ways.  
The most noticeable of these is the basis for financial 
contributions to the programme, although this reflects the 
expectation that Horizon Europe contributions will need  
to be calculated in a different way from predecessor 
programmes. This is explored in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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An overview of the negotiation
A detailed discussion of the specifics of the agreement reached 
through this simulation is given in Chapter 3. However, the 
general shape of the negotiation process and the participants’ 
experience of it also provides some valuable insights.
Initial meeting
The negotiations began positively. Both teams came to a 
similar view as to what issues a deal should cover, and their 
opening offers broadly matched each team’s expectations. 
In this meeting, and throughout the process, the participants 
grappled with how far the agreement they were creating 
should be a completely standalone deal or designed to be 
subordinate to a wider free-trade agreement. This would 
affect what needs to be included in a research and 
innovation deal and what would be better covered in other 
agreements between the parties. This issue is discussed 
further in Chapter 4.
The EU team started by stressing the importance of reaching 
an agreement for the benefit of research and innovation in 
both the UK and EU. They saw an agreement on research 
and innovation as a win-win for both sides. The EU team 
recognised the UK’s contribution to European research over 
the last 40 years and the collective need for collaboration to 
continue. They offered the UK full participation in Horizon 
Europe (with no cherry-picking of certain areas) and 
suggested that the terms of such an agreement be closely 
based on similar association agreements to Horizon 2020. 
They were clear that any “special treatment” towards the UK 
in comparison to other Associated Countries would need to 
show a clear added benefit to the Union. 
Scientists on the EU team saw the current research and 
innovation relationship between the EU and UK (with the 
UK as a Member State) as mutually beneficial and wanted 
to keep as many arrangements as close as possible to the 
status quo. However, other participants and observers 
noted that changes in the EU-UK relationship would be 
necessary following Brexit, even if they were not in the 
interest of scientific cooperation. Difficulties arose at 
various points in the negotiations when attempts to 
maintain the status quo, for the benefit of research and 
innovation, were found to be in conflict with the teams’ 
views of what would be politically acceptable.
The UK team reciprocated the EU’s positive opening tone. They 
noted the importance of EU cooperation to its research and 
innovation sector and the role that EU funding and EU scientists 
have had in creating a strong research base in the UK. The UK 
team stated its commitment to the EU scientific community  
and its strong desire to continue collaborating, no matter what 
happens with Brexit. The UK team also wanted full access to 
Horizon Europe and made an upfront commitment to fully cover 
the financial cost of its participation, including a contribution to 
the programme’s administration costs. 
Both teams were clear that a research and innovation  
deal would have to go beyond the provisions of a typical 
agreement focused on association to a Framework 
Programme. They agreed that arrangements on researcher 
mobility and regulatory alignment would need to be 
included to make any deal acceptable to both sides. 
The UK team made an early decision to accept Court of 
Justice of the European Union oversight on this agreement 
and not to ask for voting rights in the committees that 
administer Horizon Europe – two areas that could potentially 
have been contentious. The UK team did not believe that  
this would be deliverable by the EU side, as it would be 
unprecedented, and that pushing these issues would waste 
time and set the wrong tone for the negotiations.
Second meeting
The second joint meeting, the main negotiation, proved  
to be more challenging. While there had been broad 
agreement on the objectives for the negotiation, it was 
harder to find agreement on specific wording that would be 
acceptable to both teams. On the three key remaining areas 
for negotiation – people, money, regulation – progress was 
slow, and ultimately no conclusion was reached.
The UK team in particular gave a lot of thought to how  
to balance what might be desirable for the research 
community against what was likely to be politically 
acceptable to the UK government. In some areas this 
prompted the UK to begin by offering general statements  
of intent, using phrases such as “best endeavours”, instead 
of the binding commitments. The EU team also struggled 
with its own internal dynamics, trying to find positions  
that would be acceptable to all its team members and,  
in turn, the wider Union. This led the EU to stick closely  
to precedent and what had already been offered, or was 
expected to be offered, in other association agreements.
Final meeting
A third and final negotiation meeting was added to the 
process to focus on crystallising existing progress into 
agreed text and to focus attention on a small number of 
outstanding areas. Finally, agreement was reached on  
the text of a deal, subject to minor modifications to reflect 
the spirit of the discussions.
The overall outcome
Both teams were happy with the negotiated deal, with a shared 
belief that the negotiations were conducted in a constructive 
and pragmatic manner. This process has shown that a deal is 
possible if focus remains on the mutual benefits of cooperation 
on research and innovation. However, it is important to 
recognise the actual negotiations may be more hard-nosed and 
less pragmatic than our process. This could see the EU and the 
UK being less willing to compromise. The UK team are aware 
this agreement is close to a best-case scenario for the UK. It is 
likely, with wider political factors at play, the actual negotiations 
will see the UK having to offer more and expect less in return.
It is possible that in reality the agreement our process 
produced would not be politically acceptable to the 
Commission, the Member States or the British authorities. 
However, in many areas the agreement draws on existing 
precedents, including Horizon 2020 association agreements. 
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Chapter 3:  
Our research and innovation agreement
In this chapter we analyse the key issues in the 
research and innovation agreement that our process 
produced, explaining the background to each area,  
the positions that the two teams adopted, and the 
conclusion of the negotiating process. This provides  
a guide to interpreting the text of the agreement 
produced.
Major themes in the agreement
As noted in Chapter 2, the format of the agreement is 
based on existing Horizon 2020 association agreements, 
with additional content added to reflect the broader 
ambition of the proposed deal.
To provide a framework for the discussions, Wellcome staff 
analysed the EU’s association agreements with Norway, 
Switzerland, Israel, Ukraine and the Faroe Islands and 
assembled a skeleton agreement. This also provided a set 
of precedents in areas such as influence and calculating  
an Associated Country’s financial contributions.
Using existing association agreements as a model for  
our deal raised the question of whether it should be a 
standalone agreement or subordinate to an overall 
framework for EU-UK relations. This issue is considered  
in more detail in Chapter 4.
The full text of the agreement produced is appended to  
this report. In each section that follows we begin with key 
quotations from the final text and then go on to explain how 
this was agreed and why. We have arranged the key issues 
as follows, grouping together information that is spread 
across different sections of the agreement text itself:
1. Full participation in Horizon Europe
2. Financial contribution
3. Governance and ‘soft influence’
4. Dispute settlement
5. Researcher mobility
6. Regulation and common standards
7. Free flow of data for research
8. Erasmus, Euratom and access to infrastructure
9. Time to implement ‘enhanced’ provisions
10.  Areas not covered by the agreement or not 
discussed in detail as part of the process
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1. Full participation in Horizon Europe 
Background
As a Member State, the UK has benefited from complete 
access to the Horizon 2020 programme. Other non-EU 
countries such as Israel and Ukraine have dedicated 
association agreements that also allow them to  
participate fully.
The successor programme, Horizon Europe, will begin in 
2021 – when the UK is expected to no longer be a Member 
State. The current proposed draft regulation establishing 
the Horizon Europe programme suggests that third-country 
participation could be limited – either by excluding non-
Member States from entire pillars of the programme19 or 
limiting participation in areas relating to security20. It is 
currently unclear whether Associated Countries will be able 
to access single-beneficiary schemes such as European 
Research Council grants. 
From the opposite point of view, it is conceivable that a 
country wishing to associate to Horizon Europe might want 
to pick and choose which elements of the programme it 
wished to participate in, perhaps prioritising only the area’s 
most important to its own research interests or programmes 
in which it has been more successful in the past.
Negotiating positions
The EU team was clear from the start that the UK’s 
association agreement would be closely based on 
precedents established by existing Horizon 2020 
association agreements, and that anything beyond that 
would need to demonstrate clear benefit to the Union.
During the initial scoping meeting it become clear that both 
parties wanted the UK to be a full member of Horizon 
Europe, with access to all pillars and parts of the 
programme as a default, including the single-beneficiary 
schemes. Both parties were keen to keep cooperation as 
close as possible to the mutually beneficial relationship that 
was enjoyed when the UK was a Member State. 
However, the possibility of exclusion was clearly 
established in the draft regulation for Horizon Europe, and 
both teams recognised that in some circumstances it would 
be justifiable for the UK not to participate in certain 
programmes (for security or market sensitivity reasons). The 
UK team made it clear that any wider exclusion from whole 
areas, like the European Research Council, or other 
single-beneficiary grants, would undermine any benefit to 
the UK from participation in the programme, and privately 
they discussed the possibility of walking away from the 
negotiations if this were the case.
Outcome
The teams concluded that full participation in Horizon 
Europe would be the default, but in any situation where the 
EU wished to exclude the UK from specific programmes, 
the joint committee, established as part of this agreement, 
(see section 3 below) would be informed at least six months 
before any exclusion came into force. The EU team agreed 
not to exclude the UK from entire pillars or parts by default 
(such as single-beneficiary schemes).
The United Kingdom shall have access 
to all pillars and horizontal programmes 
under the framework, unless specified 
in the work programme in accordance 
with [Article 18.5 of the regulation to 
establish Horizon Europe]. Should  
any limitations on United Kingdom 
participation in specific work 
programmes be introduced under 
[Article 18.5], the Joint Committee 
established by Article 16 of this 
agreement must be notified at least  
six months in advance of the limitation 
coming into force.
—  Paragraph 5 of the research and innovation 
agreement our teams negotiated.
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2. Financial contribution 
Background
To participate in Horizon 2020, a GDP-based formula is 
used to determine the financial contribution of Associated 
Countries. The standard formula, used by Switzerland, 
Israel, Ukraine, the Faroe Islands and others is as follows:
The proportionality factor governing the contribution of 
[country] shall be obtained by establishing the ratio 
between the gross domestic product of [country], at market 
prices, and the sum of gross domestic products, at market 
prices, of the Member States of the European Union.21
That is, the GDP of the country is divided by the total GDP 
of the EU Member States to determine that country’s 
proportional contribution.
Norway and Iceland, as members of the European 
Economic Area (EEA), use a modified GDP formula with 
their own GDP added to the denominator. This results in a 
lower total cost than for other countries using the standard 
formula above.
How much the UK is willing to pay into Horizon Europe 
could depend on how much it expects to get back from  
the program. The UK is currently very successful in  
Horizon 2020. It is currently second in both the number  
of participants in the programme and the amount of 
programme funding received. The UK’s current average 
success rate in Horizon 2020 is 14.6%, compared to the EU 
average of 12%.22 In certain programmes, the UK’s success 
is even higher – receiving 22% of total European Research 
Council funds23. Between 2007 and 2013, the UK received 
€8.8 billion of direct EU funding for research, against an 
estimated contribution of €5.4bn.24
However, the UK has already seen a dip in its success rate 
since the referendum result. Figures from EU databases 
show that the UK’s share of funding fell from 16% of Horizon 
2020 funding in 2015, just before the referendum, to just over 
11% in 2018. The figures also show that the number of UK 
applications to Horizon 2020 fell from 19,127 to 11,746 over 
the same period – a reduction of nearly 40%.25
On the other hand, several countries are content to be  
net contributors to the Framework Programmes – clearly 
recognising that the benefits of participation are more than 
financial. For example, Norway has made association a 
core element of its national research policy since 1987 
despite often paying more into the programme than it 
receives back.26 The Norwegian Research Council has 
described full association as “without any doubt our 
country’s most important international partnership within 
research and innovation”.27
The UK’s GDP is such that it would be the largest non-
member contributor to the programme if its financial 
contribution were to be calculated using the Horizon  
2020 methodologies, at around £1.5 bn per year.28  
Some commentators have suggested that this would  
mean that the UK should be able to demand a greater 
degree of influence over the programme (see section 3).
On the other hand, and as reflected in EU proposed text 
establishing rules for participation in Horizon Europe, the 
EU is expected to move away from a fixed GDP-based 
formula for computing the contributions of Associated 
Countries.29 Under the proposed Horizon Europe rules, 
contributions are to be regularly and automatically 
corrected so as to reflect “fair balance”30 (or address “any 
imbalance”31) as regards each country’s contributions and 
benefits. This automatic correction mechanism effectively 
implies a move away from fixed GDP-based contributions. 
The wording leaves much room for interpretation – i.e. the 
initial contribution, though ultimately corrected, may still be 
based on a GDP-based formula. What is clear however, is 
that that the EU is looking to tie participation more closely 
The financial contribution of the United 
Kingdom to the Programme shall be 
established on a yearly basis in addition 
to the amount available each year in the 
general budget of the European Union. 
The United Kingdom’s contribution shall 
be obtained using a rolling average  
of its receipts committed under the 
Programme and its predecessor, 
Horizon 2020. The average will be 
calculated over the previous three years 
in which the United Kingdom was an 
active participant in the Programme or 
its predecessor.
Where figures from the predecessor 
programme are used in calculating the 
three-year rolling average referred to 
[above], these will be scaled to reflect 
the budget for Horizon Europe. Active 
participation shall be understood to 
mean participating as a Member State 
or an Associated Country.
An appropriate figure to cover 
programme functioning costs will be 
added to the UK’s annual contribution. 
This figure will be based on the most 
recent and accurate data available to  
the European Commission.
—  Paragraphs 27–29 of the research and innovation 
agreement our teams negotiated.
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to the direct financial benefit received by each partner 
country, rather than on the relative size of the country’s 
economy. This move away from a fixed GDP-based formula 
may be motivated by several factors. Most relevant for our 
discussion is the EU’s ambition to broaden the Horizon 
Europe associations to include large economies such as  
the USA and Canada. Given their size and potential level  
of participation, a fixed GDP-based formula may make such 
an association unattractive to these countries. 
Negotiating positions
Both teams agreed it would not be politically acceptable to  
the EU for the UK to remain a net beneficiary of Framework 
Programme funding as a non-Member State. The EU team did 
not see “subsidising” UK research and innovation at the cost 
of its own Member States as acceptable to the Union, and the 
UK was willing to accept this, given that the draft regulation for 
Horizon Europe suggests this will be the EU’s position.
The UK team’s position was that the UK should “pay its 
way” to participate in Horizon Europe, albeit with an 
additional contribution to cover programme administration 
and running costs. Recognising that the benefits of 
participation were more than financial, the UK wanted to 
make a “generous and fair” contribution, fully covering  
its participation. The UK team did not want to accept a 
GDP-based formula – considering the size of UK GDP  
and the large upfront costs this would involve, even if it 
were subject to the subsequent correction mechanism. 
The UK team was also conscious that the UK’s current high 
success rate under Horizon 2020 may not continue into 
Horizon Europe, making a seven-year commitment to large 
GDP-based payments a risk, even with a subsequent 
correction mechanism. The UK team was also mindful  
of increased public and political scrutiny over payments  
to the EU, and the need to demonstrate value for money.
The EU team focused on the mooted correction 
mechanism, deciding that the initial upfront payment was 
less important if any “significant imbalance” between an 
Associated Country’s contribution and receipts would 
subsequently be rebalanced. The EU team was ready  
to move away from the GDP calculation, feeling it was  
no longer relevant in the context of the correction 
mechanism. Furthermore, the EU team was keen to stress 
that administration costs, around 5% in Horizon 2020,32  
were not the same as the true functioning costs of the 
programme and wanted to ensure any contribution by  
the UK acknowledged this difference. 
‘Functioning costs’ refer to all costs incurred in  
“the management, execution and operation of the 
Programme”,33 of which administration costs are just  
a subset. For example, functioning costs also include 
expenses relating to “evaluating the achievement of [the 
Programme’s] objectives […] to the studies, meetings of 
experts, information and communication actions, in so far 
as they are related to the objectives of the Programme, as 
well as expenses linked to information technology networks 
focusing on information processing and exchange”.34
Some dissenting voices on both teams worried about the 
precedent that moving away from a GDP-based approach 
would set. They believed that the defining feature of  
the Framework Programmes was the concept of the 
“communal pot”, with excellence being the only criteria 
used to determine which projects or people were funded. 
They were concerned that a combination of the “pay as you 
go” contribution and the correction mechanism would lead 
to a “juste retour” approach to research funding – with 
every participant expecting to get back what it pays in. 
The EU took a very even-handed approach to the UK 
financial contribution – deciding that a new “pay in  
what you take out” formula would be acceptable if the 
functioning costs were also covered. If pushed, the UK 
team would have accepted a GDP-based formula, although 
this was not its preferred outcome. This would have 
resulted in a considerably higher initial UK contribution 
(before ‘corrections’). If the EU team had pushed for a GDP-
based calculation, the UK would likely have asked for more 
concessions elsewhere in the agreement in an attempt to 
justify such a large financial settlement.
Outcome
The teams agreed that the UK’s annual contribution  
should be calculated from a rolling average of the UK’s 
‘programme receipts’ over the previous three years. 
Programme receipts refers to money received by the UK 
from the programme in the form of grants to UK researchers 
and organisations. The initial annual contribution to Horizon 
Europe would be calculated using the UK’s average 
receipts during the whole of Horizon 2020, scaled up to 
represent the new Horizon Europe budget. In subsequent 
years, as new Horizon Europe figures become available, 
they would be incorporated into the rolling average.  
The teams agreed that only “active years”, where the  
UK is a Member State or Associated Country, would count. 
This would protect the EU if there was a discontinuity  
in UK participation which would cause UK receipts to fall 
dramatically – and thereby pull the rolling average down.
The teams also agreed that the UK would pay an additional 
percentage on top of its yearly receipts to compensate  
the EU for the administration and running costs for the 
program. It was agreed that the two teams did not have  
the relevant information to determine what this percentage 
should be. The UK team was content for the Commission to 
calculate an appropriate contribution to the costs using the 
most recent and relevant data. They did, however, stipulate 
that “appropriate” be added to the agreement to prevent 
this clause being used more generally to increase the UK’s 
contribution.
How the correction mechanism will work in practice, such as 
the level of financial imbalance that triggers the correction 
mechanism, was not negotiated. It was felt that these details 
will be set in the final Horizon Europe legislation, and as the 
mechanism will apply to all Associated Countries equally, 
further negotiation was not needed. 
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3. Governance and ‘soft influence’ 
Background
Countries associated to Horizon 2020 have some ‘soft 
influence’ over decision-making as part of the programme, 
even without the formal representation that comes with 
being a Member State. Associated Countries can 
participate in Programme Committees, the committees 
which oversee and administer the Framework Programmes. 
Associated countries do not have voting rights in these 
committees, but they do have the same access and 
speaking rights as Member States. Representatives from 
Associated Countries can also participate in the European 
Research and Innovation Advisory Committee (ERAC), 
Expert Advisory Groups and working groups which support 
and advise the Programme Committees. 
However, there is also precedent for Associated Countries 
to have additional mechanisms for influence. Israel’s 
association agreement establishes a designated “Joint 
EU-Israel Committee”. This committee has responsibility  
to “evaluate and review” the implementation of the Israel 
association agreement, and “to ensure and facilitate the 
timely and continuous provision of information concerning 
the implementation of activities under the Horizon 2020 
Programme”.35
Negotiating positions
The UK team took an early decision not to pursue formal 
voting rights, as this would be unprecedented for a non-
Member State. Their view was that securing this would also 
be of limited benefit, since Programme Committees are 
consensus driven and votes are very rare.36 The UK team 
also understood the political need for the EU to distinguish 
between member and non-Member States, and that voting 
rights are an important way to do this.
However, the UK team did want to secure additional 
informal influence and proposed that a joint EU-UK 
committee should be formed. Like the EU-Israel 
Committee, it would be responsible for monitoring and 
overseeing the delivery of the agreement but also ensure 
the regular exchange of views between the two parties. 
However, it appears that the EU-Israel Committee only 
meets every two years, and the UK team wanted a 
commitment to more regular meetings secured in the text. 
During the negotiation the EU team argued that this was 
unnecessary: the agreement states that “the Committee 
shall meet upon the request of one of the Parties”, 
reflecting the arrangements Israel currently has.
The UK requested additional influence over the long-term 
strategic direction of Horizon Europe through the joint 
committee. This is something not currently granted in any 
Horizon 2020 association agreement. The UK asked that the 
scope of the proposed joint EU-UK committee be extended 
to include the discussion of “strategic priorities”, to give the 
UK some say over the long-term direction of the programme. 
The UK team felt that Horizon Europe’s move towards a 
more “top-down”, mission-led, approach to research37  
could make UK influence in this area even more important. 
The EU team accepted that the knowledge and expertise  
of the UK research community was an asset to the Union. 
They agreed that maintaining this influence, via formal  
and informal channels, was in the interest of both the UK 
and EU. The EU saw granting the UK’s request for a joint 
committee as a win-win solution and following the overall 
precedent set in other association agreements.
Outcome
On paper, this could have been one of the more difficult 
issues to resolve. The UK could have demanded voting 
rights, based on its size, financial contribution and historical 
research base – something that the EU was unlikely to grant. 
The EU could have rigidly stuck to what it had previously 
offered to other countries associated to Horizon 2020, with 
no scope for improvement. Instead, a compromise was 
found. The EU was willing to accept a slightly augmented 
form of the Joint EU-Israel Committee, and the UK accepted 
it would not get voting rights. Both parties agreed that the 
knowledge and experience of the UK research community 
has contributed to the success of the Framework 
Programme, and its influence should continue.
The Joint EU-United Kingdom 
Research and Innovation Committee 
composed of the representatives  
of the European Union and the  
United Kingdom is hereby established.  
The Committee’s functions shall 
include the following: 
(a)   To ensure, evaluate and review the 
implementation of this Agreement.
(b)   To ensure and facilitate the timely 
and continuous provision of 
information concerning the 
implementation of activities under 
the Horizon Europe Programme.
(c)   To discuss the future orientations 
and strategic priorities of the 
Programme, and policies to support 
the European Research Area.
—  Paragraph 16 of the research and innovation 
agreement our teams negotiated.
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4. Dispute settlement 
Background
A mechanism for settling legal disputes is needed in all 
international agreements.38 For most countries associated 
to Horizon 2020, this role falls to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). For Norway and Iceland, under  
the provisions of the EEA Agreement, dispute resolution is 
overseen by the separate EFTA Court system.39
The CJEU interprets and enforces EU laws, ensuring they  
are applied consistently across countries and institutions.  
It is made up of judges from all Member States, meaning  
that the UK would lose its formal representation following a 
withdrawal from the EU.40 Some in the UK see the jurisdiction 
of the ECJ over the UK as a barrier to sovereignty. This has 
previously been a “red line” for the UK.41
Outcome
The UK team decided to accept ECJ and European Court 
of Auditors jurisdiction over the agreement and did not try 
and negotiate an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. 
This decision was partly based on the belief that the  
ECJ would only mediate disputes between individual 
researchers and not impact national laws. Wellcome’s own 
review of ECJ rulings over the past ten years found “no 
examples of it arbitrating pre-competitive research disputes 
between collaborators under Framework Programmes.”42 
The need for the UK to accept ECJ oversight over EU 
programmes it wished to participate in was acknowledged 
by Theresa May when she was UK Prime Minister.43 
However, her successor, or future governments, could 
make a different assessment. 
If the UK had decided to explore alternatives to Court of 
Justice of the European Union oversight, this would have 
needed to be established in an overreaching agreement 
covering all the UK’s interactions with the EU. It would be 
impractical to establish such a system solely for a research 
and innovation agreement such as this.
Recovery and enforcement decisions 
taken by the Commission under the 
Programmes covered by this Agreement 
which impose a pecuniary obligation  
on persons other than states shall be 
enforceable in the UK. If so requested 
by the Commission, the authority 
designated by the UK shall commence 
proceedings for the enforcement of the 
decision on behalf of the Commission. 
In this case, the decision of the 
Commission shall be submitted to the 
UK court, without other formality than 
verification of the authenticity of the 
decision, by the authority designated  
for this purpose by the UK, which  
shall inform the Commission thereof. 
Enforcement shall take place in 
accordance with the UK law and rules  
of procedure. The relevant enforcement 
provisions shall be incorporated in the 
grant agreements and/or contracts with 
participants from the UK. The Court of 
Justice of the European Union shall 
have jurisdiction to review the legality  
of the decision of the Commission and 
suspend its enforcement. Moreover, the 
courts of the UK shall have jurisdiction 
over complaints that enforcement is 
being carried out in an irregular manner. 
—  Paragraph 26 of the research and innovation 
agreement our teams negotiated.
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5. Researcher mobility
Background
Evidence shows that international collaboration makes 
research stronger and the research workforce is 
internationally mobile – mobile researchers have around 40% 
higher citation rates44 in scientific journals and collaborative 
publications generally have more impact.45 Surveys have 
shown over 48% of EU researchers have been internationally 
mobile at some point during their career46 and that Europe is 
a particularly mobile and connected research community.47 
As a member of the European Union, the UK has been 
committed to the free movement of people under EU law. 
This has allowed researchers, their families, and those in 
the wider research community, to travel, live and work 
across the Union with limited restrictions. 
Provisions covering the mobility of researchers, and 
migration more broadly, are often found in overarching 
association agreements or free-trade agreements that 
would be in place before association to the Horizon 
frameworks could be agreed.
The extent to which association agreements to Horizon 
2020 include provisions on immigration and researcher 
mobility varies:
•  Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, although not EU 
Member States, are signed up to free movement  
of people with the EU – Norway and Iceland through 
their EEA membership48 and Switzerland via its own 
bilateral agreement49
•  The broader Israel Euro-Mediterranean Agreement50 
states that “the Parties shall cooperate with a view  
in particular to: defining areas of mutual interest 
concerning policies on immigration”. Israel’s Horizon 
2020 Association Agreement51 makes no mention of 
researcher mobility
•  The broader EU-Ukraine Association Agreement52 states 
that “The Parties shall also endeavour to enhance the 
mobility of citizens and to make further progress on the 
visa dialogue”. It also states that “the Parties shall take 
gradual steps towards a visa-free regime in due course, 
provided that the conditions for well-managed and 
secure mobility […] are in place”. Ukraine’s Horizon 2020 
Association Agreement goes further, to say, “the Parties 
will make every effort, within the framework of the 
existing provisions, to facilitate the free movement  
and residence of research workers participating in  
the activities covered by this Agreement”.53 
Negotiating positions
The EU team prioritised maintaining researcher mobility  
in way that matches as closely as possible the current 
freedom of movement arrangements, for research workers 
at least. They argued that the movement of researchers  
was critical to the success of grants awarded through  
the Framework Programme, and that without the free 
movement of researchers, UK association to Horizon 
Europe would not be in the best interest of the EU.
The UK team mirrored this sentiment and was keen to make 
an offer that would ensure there was easy and flexible 
movement of researchers and their immediate families. 
They reflected on public opinion surveys showing support 
for skilled migration54 and signals from the Boris Johnson 
government that they are looking to expand mobility 
schemes for scientists.55
However, the UK team was concerned about trying to set or 
restrict the immigration policy of the current, or future, UK 
government. They also knew that continued free movement 
in its current form would be politically difficult in the UK. 
Although both teams had similar desires for a speedy  
and flexible immigration system, they had fundamental 
differences in the level of commitment they were willing to 
make. The EU team was looking for cast-iron guarantees 
that would protect the movement of its researchers and 
ensure they were legally protected when resident in the UK. 
The UK team wanted to make an aspirational ‘best efforts’ 
statement to deliver such a system but felt unable to offer 
the level of detailed commitments needed by the EU. 
The gap between the initial positions persisted throughout 
the process, with the UK determined to stick to broad 
statements of best endeavours and the EU requesting 
tangible commitments and protections for its citizens.
The Parties commit to establishing 
favourable immigration arrangements  
to ensure the good functioning of the 
European Research Area. The Parties 
will ensure the reciprocal right of 
movement and residence of individuals 
participating in the activities covered by 
this Agreement, along with their direct 
family members. Direct family members 
of those individuals will be granted the 
right to work. 
      —  Paragraph 18 of the research and innovation 
agreement our teams negotiated.
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Outcome
The breakthrough came when the EU team moved away 
from “free” movement and instead focused on “reciprocal” 
movement as its core demand. 
Both teams looked at the current EU directive (2016/801) 
covering the entry of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of research for guidance as to what a future 
reciprocal system could entail.56 The UK is currently not 
subject to this directive, as the UK has an opt-out on issues 
relating to home affairs. The provisions in this directive 
provide a helpful framework for what reciprocal movement 
arrangements could look like.
The existing directive states that:
•  researchers covered by Union or multilateral 
programmes are granted a stay of at least two years;
•  the directive makes provisions for researchers’ family 
members to join the researcher and work;
•  researchers are able to move from one Member State 
to another in order to carry out part of their research for 
a period of up to 180 days;
•  the directive calls for “collaboration between research 
organisations and the immigration authorities” to speed 
up decision-making. It also calls for research 
organisations to be given a “key role in the admission 
procedure” and the ability to “approve” applications. 
Both teams saw these provisions as a starting point for a 
future “reciprocal” researcher mobility system that could  
be both open and flexible, while moving away from free 
movement. The UK team requested the added caveat  
that the new system should offer “favourable immigration 
arrangements” to ensure it promoted an open and 
welcoming system, as the teams intended it. 
The UK team was also happy that many of the provisions 
highlighted above are already present elsewhere in the UK 
immigration system. For example, the UK’s Research and 
Innovation Talent Visa57 enables individuals with exceptional 
talent to live and work in the UK for up to five years. 
Therefore, although major changes would be needed  
to implement this provision, nothing being proposed  
would be completely new. 
There have also been signals in the UK that the Boris 
Johnson government was willing to explore making special 
arrangements for researchers, which meant that a ‘carve-
out’ for the sector could be politically acceptable. The EU 
side was also happy that arrangements along these lines 
would ensure the mutually beneficial movement of 
researchers continued.
Rather than reference the directive itself, the agreed 
wording in the agreement refers to a broad commitment  
to establish arrangements. It was felt that this would be a 
better approach than referring to EU legislation directly.
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6. Regulation and common standards 
Background
As a Member State, UK regulation is aligned with that of the 
EU. This means that collaborative research between UK 
and EU institutions is made easier by everyone playing by 
the same rules. For example, Cancer Research UK has 
previously reported that differing standards between the  
EU and the USA have made some clinical trials unfeasible.58 
Wellcome also has direct experience of the time, cost and 
effort needed to ensure European animal welfare standards 
are met for research taking place in the USA, which is a 
requirement of our funding.59 
As with mobility, issues of regulatory alignment would 
normally be covered by an overarching agreement between 
the two parties. For example, the EU-Ukraine association 
agreement states that “The Parties recognise the 
importance of the approximation of Ukraine’s existing 
legislation to that of the European Union. Ukraine shall 
ensure that its existing laws and future legislation will be 
gradually made compatible with the EU acquis”.60 This 
reflects the Ukraine’s intention to seek EU membership in 
the future. Neither the Israel Euro-Mediterranean agreement 
nor Israel’s association agreement to Horizon 2020 
mentions the alignment of regulation. 
Norway and Switzerland have close regulatory alignment with 
the EU through their EEA/EFTA membership and bilateral 
agreements.61 More broadly, common standards are often an 
important part of trade agreements and could be a wider 
political issue in the UK’s future relationship with the EU.
Negotiating positions
The EU team was clear that the current level of regulation  
in the field of research and innovation between the UK  
and EU should remain the minimum acceptable level.  
They suggested that the UK would be free to enhance 
regulation, as it already does in some areas, but the EU 
would not accept deregulating in key areas connected to 
this agreement. 
The EU team were worried that deregulation by the UK 
would make collaboration more difficult and costlier, and in 
some areas impossible. They were also concerned that the 
UK may try and undercut EU regulation to give themselves 
a competitive advantage. They believed this would lead to 
lower overall standards in areas such as animal welfare and 
data protection, and would put EU research and innovation 
at a disadvantage. 
The UK team also understood the need for a similar level  
of regulation between both parties in the key areas covered  
by this agreement. However, they were concerned that 
committing the UK to regulatory alignment with the EU  
in large areas would have implications well beyond the 
research and innovation sector. 
Ultimately, the UK team wrestled internally with the difficulty 
of trying to reconcile a desire for common standards  
with the political imperative of not giving up the UK’s 
‘sovereignty’ in this area. To try to tackle this tension,  
the UK began with a list of specific areas where it was  
felt that commitment to alignment would be appropriate –  
for example, animal welfare and clinical trials regulation. 
Realising that such an approach would be complex and 
difficult to administer, the UK team changed tack during  
the negotiation, instead looking for a more general 
statement of intent to keep regulation between the UK and 
EU “compatible”. The UK was looking for softer language  
in order to make the agreement as palatable as possible to 
a UK audience. 
The EU team was looking for a more concrete commitment 
to regulatory alignment, like that found in the Ukraine 
association agreement – committing the UK to have 
approximation/ compatible regulation to the EU in the  
areas covered by this agreement. However, the context  
of Ukraine’s agreement is that the country is aspiring to  
join the EU in the future, whereas the UK intends to leave. 
Outcome 
A compromise was found when the UK offered language 
from the current EU-UK Political Declaration. Although the 
wording was adapted from a paragraph originally on trade, 
the EU side saw it as a fair precedent that already had 
agreement from the real UK and EU negotiators.
The EU team was also reassured that many regulatory 
standards are enforced through the terms of Model Grant 
Agreements (MGAs). MGAs provide a legal framework  
for consortia participating in Horizon 2020 and include 
provisions relating to, for example, ethical standards,  
data sharing, intellectual property rights, and ECJ 
jurisdiction. These provisions provide safeguards for the EU 
to ensure that EU standards are respected in Horizon 2020 
collaboration. The provision granting legal authority to the 
ECJ is an especially powerful tool in safeguarding EU laws.
This would effectively maintain EU standards for any  
UK organisation looking to access funds through this 
programme.
Both teams agreed that the free flow of data was of such 
significance that it should be treated separately in the 
agreement. This is explored in the next section.
While preserving regulatory autonomy, 
the Parties will put in place provisions 
to promote regulatory approaches that 
are transparent, efficient, promote 
avoidance of unnecessary barriers  
to scientific collaboration and are 
compatible to the extent possible.
      —  Paragraph 19 of the research and innovation 
agreement our teams negotiated.
A post-Brexit agreement for research and innovation | 22
7. Free flow of data for research
Background
The transfer of personal data between the UK and EU is a 
critical component of research collaboration. Wellcome’s 
‘Brexit and Beyond’ report explains that:
Personal data about individuals is an essential  
resource for health and social research, for example for 
understanding the links between lifestyle and disease or 
education and life outcomes. Researchers often use fully 
anonymous data, but in some cases identifiable data is 
needed in order to identify significant patterns or to link 
datasets. Using personal data therefore supports research 
that saves and improves people’s lives, for example  
by better diagnosing disease. To deliver these benefits, 
researchers need to be able to exchange personal data 
across borders. For example, there are typically around 
2,500 requests a year from EU27 countries for access to 
data from the UK 1958 Birth Cohort.62
While the UK is a Member State, the GDPR regulation 
provides for free flow of data between the UK and EU. When 
the UK leaves the EU, this will no longer be the case. For free 
flow to continue, the UK will require an “adequacy”63 decision 
from the European Commission demonstrating that its data 
protection approach is of a comparable standard to that of 
the EU. Once adequacy is granted, data can flow to and 
from the UK without the need for additional safeguards.64  
An adequacy decision by the Commission is by no means 
guaranteed. Even as an EU Member State the UK has 
breached EU laws in this area and concerns remain within 
the EU over the UK’s use of bulk data collection.65 These 
concerns will only be amplified after Brexit and make a  
quick and positive adequacy decision for the UK less likely.
Negotiating positions
Nothing of this nature is found in other association 
agreements. This provision was requested by the UK team 
to ensure there was no disturbance in the flow of research 
data between the UK and the EU because of Brexit. It is the 
UK team’s belief that such a provision will be needed to 
protect UK research while a UK adequacy decision is 
reached, in the event one cannot be reached, or if for any 
reason a UK adequacy decision is revoked in the future. 
Outcome
This article proposes a voluntary system where 
organisations can opt-in, and by doing so will comply  
with EU data processing standards. Although the system 
would be voluntary, once an organisation had made the 
commitment it would be legally bound by the higher 
standard. In return, any organisation covered by the 
arrangement would benefit from an adequacy decision.  
This provision is based on the EU-US and Swiss-US 
Privacy Shield Frameworks,66 which similarly provide a 
sector-specific voluntary mechanism by which to comply 
with data protection requirements. The EU agreed to this 
provision with the caveat that it would only come into force 
should a UK-wide adequacy agreement not be possible.
A dedicated data protection 
arrangement will be put in place to 
ensure both Parties maintain equivalent 
levels of protection of personal data 
during activities carried out under this 
agreement. The agreement will provide 
a framework for registered organisations 
in the United Kingdom to benefit from 
an adequacy determination by the 
European Commission. It will ensure the 
safe flow of personal data between 
those registered organisations and the 
European Union, without being subject 
to any further safeguards or 
authorisations. Adequacy 
determinations will be regularly 
monitored by the Commission. This 
provision will become redundant should 
an overarching adequacy decision 
covering the United Kingdom be 
adopted.
      —  Paragraph 20 of the research and innovation 
agreement our teams negotiated.
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8.  Erasmus, Euratom and access  
to infrastructure
Background
Erasmus is the EU’s programme to support education, 
training, youth and sport in Europe. It provides 
opportunities for over 4 million Europeans to study,  
train and gain experience abroad. The movement of  
young scientists was seen by both parties as having an 
important role in encouraging and underpinning 
international scientific cooperation. 
The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
provides the basis for the regulation of civilian nuclear 
activity. It also funds leading international research. The 
current Political Declaration on the future relationship 
between the UK and the EU states that “the Parties note 
the United Kingdom’s intention to be associated with the 
Euratom research and training programmes”.67 
Negotiating positions
Erasmus and Euratom were seen as important programmes 
for supporting scientific research and collaboration by both 
parties. However, it was decided that they sat outside the 
direct scope of this negotiation. Paragraph 2 was included 
in the recitals section of the negotiated agreement to 
express both teams’ desire for continued UK participation 
in these projects.
Similarly, the teams agreed that it was important that 
researchers were able to access scientific infrastructure in 
the UK and the EU that was not covered by association to 
Horizon Europe, of which there are many examples. In each 
case the UK’s participation is subject to its own unique 
agreement, and our project did not attempt to explore the 
detail of these. 
Outcome
The teams agreed to include an acknowledgement  
of the importance of Erasmus, Euratom and access  
to infrastructure in the recitals section.
NOTING:
The importance of Euratom and 
Erasmus in supporting and 
encouraging the aims of this 
agreement, and the need for the  
United Kingdom to continue to 
participate in these programmes;
The need for scientific infrastructure  
in the European Union and United 
Kingdom to remain open and 
assessable to the citizens of both 
Parties;
—  Paragraph 2 of the research and innovation 
agreement our teams negotiated. 
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9. Time to implement ‘enhanced’ provisions. 
This agreement goes beyond the terms of a standard 
Framework Programme association agreement, with 
additional provisions on researcher mobility, regulatory 
alignment and data sharing. 
These three areas of enhanced cooperation will require  
both parties to set up additional arrangements to meet the 
requirements laid out in this agreement. For example, the 
provision on researcher mobility shows the type of system 
the parties wanted to see. However, it will take time for the 
UK and EU to design and implement such a system. 
This article gives both parties one year to put in place the 
necessary systems to be fully compliant with the agreement 
text. It also keeps open the possibility of extending this 
deadline if agreed by both parties. One consequence of this 
provision is that for one year the UK could be associated  
to Horizon Europe but without the enhanced provisions on 
researcher mobility, regulatory alignment and data sharing 
being in place. Although this situation should be avoided at 
all costs, the teams felt cooperation under these conditions, 
for a short period, was better than no agreement at all. The 
only alternative is to hold off on signing the agreement until 
the above provisions are met, which would likely mean the 
UK missing the start of the Horizon Europe programme.
Provisions to meet Articles 18 
[migration], 19 [regulation] and  
20 [data] of this agreement must be 
implemented by both Parties within one 
year of this agreement entering into 
force. Failure to do so will see this 
agreement void. This deadline can be 
extended with the written consent of 
both Parties. The implementation of 
these provisions will be monitored by 
the Joint Committee…
—  Paragraph 21 of the research and innovation 
agreement our teams negotiated.
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10.  Areas not covered by the agreement  
or not discussed in detail as part of  
the process
Alongside understanding the areas of debate and 
disagreement, it is also important to record which areas 
received relatively little attention during our project.  
This does not necessarily mean that they will not be 
important in the real negotiation process, but is partly a 
reflection of their perceived priority relative to other issues. 
•  The idea of ‘reciprocal access’ – providing EU access 
to UK national funding programmes in return for full UK 
access to the EU Framework Programme – was raised 
by the EU team. The proposed text for establishing 
rules for participation in Horizon Europe does foresee 
reciprocal access, “where appropriate”.68 It is therefore 
likely that, during the actual negotiations, the EU will 
raise this issue. Switzerland provides an example of an 
Associated Country where national programmes are 
open to EU nationals. However, the teams assessed 
that considerations around reciprocal access would 
substantially complicate the negotiations. As a result, 
these considerations were left aside. Furthermore, true 
reciprocity would require ensuring funding provisions 
for European participation in UK R&D programmes,69  
e.g. set out in Horizon Europe regulation or in the  
future EU-UK agreement. Such provisions are unlikely 
to materialise in the foreseeable future
•  Liability for payments if the agreement is terminated 
part-way through Horizon Europe was not discussed as 
it was assumed that arrangements in existing Horizon 
2020 agreements would be appropriate in this case
•  The role of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF),  
and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 
are likely to be raised during the actual negotiation in 
order to reduce potential fraudulent use of EU funds by 
a non-EU country. This issue was not discussed during 
our negotiation but the role of such organisations was 
likely to have been seen to be acceptable by the UK 
team, based on their acceptance of the role of the  
ECJ and ECA. 
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In this chapter we explore how the UK and EU  
could pursue a research and innovation agreement.  
We set out some of the challenges associated with  
the process, including the timetable for reaching an 
agreement, whether to seek a standalone agreement  
on research and innovation, and how a no-deal Brexit 
could make the process more difficult.
The process of reaching an agreement 
The October 2019 EU-UK Political Declaration suggests  
the most likely future relationship will be a combination  
of a free-trade agreement and other elements of 
cooperation that are in the “mutual interest of both  
parties”.70 An agreement of this kind would provide the 
overall framework within which UK association to Horizon 
Europe, and wider cooperation on research and innovation, 
could be built. 
We refer in a following section to the intended wider 
agreement between the EU and the UK as ‘the overall 
framework for future relations’, since the exact form is not 
yet known.
Any research and innovation agreement between the  
UK and EU would have to go through the EU’s standard 
ratification process. Association to Horizon Europe will have 
its own processes, based on the legislation establishing  
the programme. An agreement that includes association  
to Horizon Europe will be affected by this.
Seeking association to Horizon Europe
Horizon Europe is expected to be even more international  
in scope than its predecessor, Horizon 2020. The draft text 
for Horizon Europe includes a new category that would  
be open to the UK after Brexit alongside other countries.  
It creates scope for association for: 
  third countries and territories that fulfil all of the  
following criteria: 
  i.  a good capacity in science, technology and 
innovation; 
  ii.  commitment to a rules-based open market 
economy, including fair and equitable dealing 
with intellectual property rights, backed by 
democratic institutions; 
  iii.  active promotion of policies to improve the 
economic and social wellbeing of citizens71
A range of countries have expressed an interested in 
participating in Horizon Europe in this way, including 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, 
South Africa and the USA.72 Many of the issues that we 
explored in this project are likely to be relevant to the  
EU’s discussions with these countries as well.
Once the Horizon Europe regulation is fully adopted by  
the Union,73 countries that wish to associate can start  
formal negotiations with the Commission. If the precedent 
of Horizon 2020 is followed, each country would then 
negotiate a specific association agreement. However, it is 
currently expected that the regulation will not be finalised 
until well into 2020, with reports suggesting that the EU is 
delaying the process until the outcome of Brexit is clearer.74 
The UK can act now to ensure it is fully prepared for 
association ahead of the Horizon Europe legislation being 
ratified and formal association negotiations beginning.  
To plan their budgets, several countries associated to  
the existing Framework Programme (Switzerland, Israel, 
Canada) are in the process of exchanging at a technical 
level with the EU over their financial contribution to Horizon 
Europe. Further afield, it is being reported Canada and 
Japan have already earmarked money for collaboration  
with the EU.75 The UK should do the same as part of a  
post-Brexit budget.
Negotiation and ratification process
Any negotiations between the UK and the EU, whether for 
the overall framework for future relations or a standalone 
research and innovation agreement, will start with 
negotiating a mandate from the Council of the European 
Union on the basis of a draft prepared by the Commission. 
This mandate, once approved by EU Member States, will 
allow the Commission to begin the negotiations. Although 
legally speaking the mandate only requires the approval  
of a qualified majority of Member States, in practice such 
decisions are taken by common accord – i.e. unanimously 
– wherever possible. 
The Council also often adopts separate negotiating 
directives to the Commission, which specify in more  
detail what it expects the Commission to achieve in the 
negotiations. Such directives are not necessarily made 
public, although in recent times transparency has become 
more common.
Chapter 4:  
Next steps
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Negotiating rounds then begin, with the Commission 
keeping the Council and Parliament updated as the process 
develops. Once a final text is agreed, the Commission 
informs the Council and Parliament and a copy of the text  
is sent to EU Member States. A process of ‘legal scrubbing’ 
then begins to ensure the text is consistent in all EU 
languages and offers ‘legal certainty’. 
After the final text has been signed off within the 
Commission, it is passed to the Council for approval.  
This approval is made up of two separate Council 
decisions: one relates to the signature of the agreement by 
the EU (indicating formal intent to ratify), and the other to 
the formal conclusion (ratification) of the agreement itself.  
In most cases, the Council has to adopt the decisions for 
both signature and conclusion by qualified majority but in 
practice again operates by consensus wherever possible.
After the Council has approved the decision to sign,  
the EU can then formally add a signature to the text  
with its negotiating partner. At this point, elements of  
the agreement can be brought into force pending final 
ratification (referred to as “provisional application”). 
After the Council has approved the signing of the 
agreement, the final text is sent to the European  
Parliament, where it is debated and scrutinised by the 
relevant committees before being put to a full vote of  
the Parliament for approval by simple majority. 
After such consent has been given, the Council decision 
concluding the agreement is adopted by the Member States. 
Whether an agreement also requires ratification by individual 
Member State parliaments depends on whether it includes 
provisions that are beyond the exclusive competences of the 
EU. For example, ratification of the EU-Canada agreement 
was delayed due to opposition from the Walloon Parliament. 
Formal ratification in such cases requires both the EU-level 
procedures and national ratification procedures – which vary 
by country – to be fulfilled. 
Timetable
Under the terms of the draft EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement 
(October 2019), the UK will enter a “transition period”  
after leaving the EU. In this transition period the UK will  
be treated as a Member State until 31 December 2020,  
with the exception of participation in the EU institutions  
and governance structures.76
If, as our project scenario assumes, the UK leaves the EU  
in early 2020, there will be less than one year to agree the 
overall framework for future relations before the end of  
the transition period. Meanwhile, Horizon Europe is due  
to begin on 1 January 2021.
The Withdrawal Agreement does allow for this transition 
period to be extended,77 but an extension would not 
automatically mean UK participation in Horizon Europe  
from January 2021 – indeed, the Agreement explicitly states 
that an extension of the transition period would not include 
participation in EU programmes. Ultimately, the UK and  
EU must come to an agreement on the UK’s participation  
in Horizon Europe before 31 December 2020 to avoid a 
discontinuity in the level of UK participation.78
This creates a window of 11 months for the real 
negotiations on research and innovation. Broader 
arrangements between the EU and another country (some 
of which are referred to as association agreements – which 
detail the legal, political and economic arrangements 
between the two parties) take over six years on average to 
be negotiated and enter into force.79 As a former Member 
State, the UK will initially be in full regulatory alignment with 
the EU while negotiating the future relationship. In principle 
this should make broader negotiations more straightforward 
than other third-country agreements. Nevertheless, 
fundamental questions – such as future regulatory 
alignment, movement of people and financial contributions 
– will continue to complicate the process even in 
uncontroversial areas like research and innovation,  
as this project has shown. 
What if the UK leaves the EU without  
a withdrawal agreement?
The scenario that we asked participants to adopt – that 
sufficient time had passed so that the manner of the UK’s 
withdrawal from the Union was no longer relevant – may  
not represent reality. The UK could potentially leave  
without a deal on 31 January 2020 and yet still wish to  
try to negotiate a post-Brexit research and innovation 
agreement on the timescale above. The EU’s willingness  
to do so in these circumstances is far from certain.
At the end of our project we asked participants to reflect on 
how the UK leaving without a deal would have affected their 
negotiations. They told us that:
•  A no-deal scenario in January 2020 would jeopardise 
and delay striking an agreement on research and 
innovation, in the same way that it would delay the 
wider negotiations on future EU-UK relations. It may 
also limit the willingness of both sides to find a way  
of bypassing the need for an overall agreement to be 
reached prior to making association arrangements for 
Horizon Europe, despite it being in both parties’ 
interests
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•  No deal is not an end destination or a stable outcome. 
When the two sides come back to the table following a 
no-deal Brexit, the EU might demand that outstanding 
issues from the UK’s departure be resolved before any 
future cooperation is discussed. Both sides would still 
have to resolve many, if not all, of the issues being 
negotiated as part of its withdrawal, only in more 
difficult circumstances and with more time wasted 
•  The tone of the negotiations could change substantially, 
with goodwill within the EU lost. The UK might have to 
offer more and accept less, if a deal is possible at all
•  Scientific networks and connections would be lost 
– making it more difficult to rebuild these relationships 
when and if a deal is eventually reached.
There is also a risk of a no-deal exit from the Union at the 
end of the transition period. If the terms of the future 
relationship are not agreed by the end of 2020, and the  
UK or EU decided against an extension to the transition 
period, the UK will leave the EU without an agreed future 
relationship. This could be as disruptive to negotiations on 
research and innovation as leaving without a withdrawal 
agreement in January, but could be mitigated if progress 
has been made on a standalone agreement on research 
and innovation.
What if the UK misses the start of  
Horizon Europe?
If the parties cannot agree terms of the UK’s participation  
in Horizon Europe before the programme is due to start  
in January 2021, the UK will likely be downgraded to a 
third-country participant and would be unable to access 
some elements of the programme. 
While it will be important to avoid such a discontinuity,  
there is precedent for countries to associate to the 
Framework Programmes after the programme has begun. 
The legislation establishing Horizon 2020 was only adopted 
in December 2013, a few weeks before the programme 
began in January 2014. This tight turnaround meant even 
long-established Associated Countries such as Norway 
could not join the framework until May 2014, some four 
months after initial calls opened. Norway’s association  
was backdated80 to the start of the programme, allowing 
researchers from Norway to enter programmes even  
though calls for applications had already opened. 
Additionally, Ukraine, Tunisia, Georgia and Armenia all 
joined Horizon 2020 part-way through the programme.81 
Lessons from Switzerland
In February 2014, a referendum on immigration led to the 
Swiss government delaying the ratification of a protocol 
extending the agreement on free movement of people to 
Croatia. This contravened Switzerland’s bilateral agreement 
with the EU, which included freedom of movement and 
research.82 As a result, the association agreement to 
Horizon 2020 (and negotiations for an association to 
Erasmus+) was suspended.83
The Swiss government attempted to mitigate loss of funds 
by establishing a grants programme through the Swiss 
National Science Foundation. They funded 48 grants, 
allocating a total of 92.2 million Swiss francs.84 Although 
some research funding was maintained, this required setting 
up a new commission and evaluation panels, and the 
recruitment of additional employees. Furthermore, scientists 
in Switzerland expressed concern over a loss of prestige 
associated with European Research Council funding.85
In September 2014, Switzerland and the EU agreed on a 
‘partial’ association agreement for the three years leading up 
to the actual transcription of the referendum result into law.86 
During this period, the participation of Switzerland as an 
Associated Country covered actions under the Excellent 
Science pillar containing the European Research Council, 
Future and Emerging Technologies, Research Infrastructures, 
and the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions. These 
programmes, implemented through single-beneficiary  
grants, are not accessible to third-country partners.
However, Switzerland was still ineligible for funding in  
two of the three pillars of Horizon 2020, including some 
innovation and enterprise programmes. The number  
of Swiss leadership roles in Horizon 2020 projects also 
decreased significantly.
Switzerland eventually returned to Associated Country 
status in 2017 with full participation in the Horizon 2020 
programmes. This was only possible through implemented 
Swiss legislation respecting free movement and thus 
allowing the ratification of the Croatian protocol.87 
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Science as part of a wider EU-UK  
relationship or as a standalone agreement
The uncertainty around the future EU-UK relationship  
made it difficult for participants in our simulated negotiation 
to decide what should be included in a research and 
innovation agreement and what would be covered by a 
wider association or overarching agreement with the EU. 
This question persisted throughout the negotiation.  
It was decided that provisions needed to be included to 
give both sides the reassurances and protections they 
needed, while accepting that this would involve straying 
outside the remit of standard Framework Programme 
association agreements or research and innovation 
agreements. For example, both sides wanted provisions  
on researcher mobility to be included, the EU team was 
keen for some form of provision on regulatory alignment, 
and the UK wanted a specific provision on data adequacy. 
All of these would normally be found in a broader umbrella 
agreement with the EU.
The core of the agreement is the terms of the UK’s 
association to Horizon Europe, but with additional 
provisions requested by either or both teams. The 
agreement makes association to Horizon Europe the 
starting point of research and innovation cooperation 
between the two parties, with cooperation expanding 
beyond the limits of the Framework Programmes.  
For example, the recitals in the agreement mention both 
parties’ commitment to the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals and the role research and innovation 
will play in helping both parties to meet these obligations. 
Participants discussed whether a research and innovation 
agreement could stand alone – i.e. be implemented without 
the need for any additional arrangements – or if it was 
necessarily contingent on a wider agreement being put  
in place first.
Pursuing a standalone research and innovation agreement 
which included association to the Framework Programmes 
would be unprecedented. Every country that is associated  
to Horizon 2020 has a pre-existing broader arrangement  
in place with the EU. These arrangements can include a 
broader association agreement, a free-trade agreement,  
or other bilateral international agreements that provide  
the legal, economic and political framework within which 
cooperation on research and innovation can be incorporated.
Our recommendation
The likelihood of having the EU-UK future relationship 
concluded within 11 months seems remote. The most likely 
outcome at this point is therefore that the UK misses the 
start of Horizon Europe due to delays in the Brexit process. 
Our analysis is that the best way to minimise disruption is  
by negotiating a standalone agreement as soon as possible, 
regardless of ongoing Brexit uncertainty elsewhere. 
The unique circumstances of Brexit, the limited time 
available, and the significance of research and innovation to 
both parties, justifies exploration of this route. A discontinuity 
in EU-UK cooperation though the Framework Programmes 
would damage research and innovation on both sides of the 
Channel. With no easy options available, unprecedented 
steps will need to be considered.
The EU does have standalone research and innovation 
agreements with third countries, but an EU-UK agreement 
will need to be more ambitious than these and include 
association to Horizon Europe.
Scientific cooperation agreements have long been used  
to symbolise improving political relations and are often the 
first bilateral agreements after a conflict between nations. 
The universality of science can provide inspiration for the 
wider negotiations if a suitable standalone agreement can 
be developed.
The agreement negotiated during this project may provide  
a blueprint for such an agreement, which would offer the 
guarantees and certainty needed for both sides and could 
subsequently sit within a wider EU-UK framework once that 
has been agreed.
While formal negotiations that include association  
to Horizon Europe cannot begin until the legislation 
establishing the programme is finalised, this should not 
preclude the UK and EU from making progress on the  
other areas that would need to be included in standalone 
agreement. In practice, our simulated negotiation suggests 
that it is these areas that will require most work. 
This approach would give the best chance of meeting  
the demanding timetable for securing a productive future 
relationship on research and innovation, to the mutual 
benefit of the UK and the EU.
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EU-UK agreement on research and innovation
Final text
1.  AGREEMENT between the European Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on cooperation 
in research and innovation, including the participation of the United Kingdom in the Union programme ‘Horizon Europe 
– the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021–2027)’.
2.  THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Commission’, on behalf of the European Union, of the one 
part, and THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, hereinafter referred to as the United Kingdom, of the other 
part, hereinafter referred to as the ‘Parties’.
RECOGNISING: 
 •  the importance of research and innovation to the future prosperity of the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the 
health of our citizens;
 •  the long history of mutual collaboration between the Parties in the areas covered by this agreement and the resulting 
benefits to scientific progress and humankind’s understanding of the world; 
 •  that world-leading research and innovation capacity is critical to achieving lasting economic development;
 •  the continued commitment of the Parties to the European Research Area;
 •  the shared commitment of the Parties to the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the role of research and innovation 
in helping humanity reach these targets;
 •  the role that research and innovation will play in tackling the issue of climate change and other global challenges.
NOTING:
 •  the importance of Euratom and Erasmus in supporting and encouraging the aims of this agreement, and the mutual 
benefit to the parties of the United Kingdom continuing to participate in these programmes;
 •  the need for scientific infrastructure in the European Union and United Kingdom to remain open and assessable to the 
citizens of both Parties;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Scope
3.  The United Kingdom shall participate as an Associated Country in ‘Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for 
Research and Innovation (2021–2027)’, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Programme’), in accordance with the conditions 
laid down in the protocol, and under the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement.
4.  Cooperation on research and innovation may also include: 
 (a)  regular discussions on the orientations and priorities for research policies and planning in the United Kingdom and 
the Union; 
 (b)  discussions on cooperation prospects and development; 
 (c)  timely provision of information concerning the implementation of programmes and research projects of the United 
Kingdom and of the Union, and concerning the results of work undertaken within the framework of this Agreement; 
 (d)  joint meetings resulting in joint declarations;
 (e)  visits and exchanges of research workers, engineers and technicians;
 (f)  regular and sustained contacts between programme managers or project managers of the United Kingdom  
and the Union; 
 (g)  participation of experts in seminars, symposia and workshops.
Agreement Text
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Terms and conditions of participation in the Programme
5.  The United Kingdom shall have access to all pillars and horizontal programmes under the framework, unless specified in 
the work programme in accordance with [Article 18.5 of the regulation to establish Horizon Europe]. Should any 
limitations on United Kingdom participation in specific work programmes be introduced under [Article 18.5], the Joint 
Committee established by Article 16 of this agreement must be notified at least six months in advance of the limitation 
coming into force.
6.  The United Kingdom shall participate in the activities of the Programme in conformity with the objectives, criteria and 
procedures defined in the regulation establishing Horizon Europe, including delegated acts and any other subsequent 
rules, and any other rule pertaining to the implementation of the Programme.
7.  Eligible United Kingdom entities shall participate in direct actions of the Joint Research Centre and in indirect actions of 
the Programme under the same conditions as those applicable to legal entities of Member States of the European Union.
8.  In relation to eligible United Kingdom entities, the terms and conditions applicable for the evaluation of proposals and those 
for the conclusion of grant agreements and the notification of grant decisions shall be the same as those applicable for 
grant agreements and grant decisions in respect of research entities in the Union.
9.  Representatives of the United Kingdom shall participate as observers in all the European Commission committees which 
assist the Commission in the management, development and implementation of the activities of the Programme. These 
committees shall meet without the presence of the representatives of the United Kingdom at the time of voting. The 
United Kingdom will be informed of the result. Participation as referred to in this paragraph shall take the same form, 
including procedures for receipt of information and documentation, as that applicable to representatives from Member 
States of the European Union. 
10.  Representatives of the United Kingdom shall participate as observers in the Board of Governors of the Joint Research 
Centre. Participation as referred to in this paragraph shall take the same form, including procedures for receipt of 
information and documentation, as that applicable to representatives from Member States of the European Union. 
11.  Travel costs and subsistence costs incurred by representatives and experts of the United Kingdom for the purposes of 
taking part as observers in the work of the committees referred to in Articles 6 and 7, or other meetings related to the 
implementation of the Programme, shall be reimbursed by the Commission on the same basis as and in accordance with 
the procedures currently in force for representatives of the Member States.
Intellectual property
12.  Legal entities established in the United Kingdom participating in Programmes covered by this Agreement shall, as 
regards ownership, exploitation and dissemination of information and intellectual property arising from such participation, 
have the same rights and obligations as legal entities established in the Union participating. Adequacy decisions will be 
regularly monitored. 
13.  This provision shall not apply to the results obtained from projects started before this agreement entered into force. 
Financial contribution
14.  To participate in the Programme, the United Kingdom shall every year pay a financial contribution to the general budget 
of the European Union in accordance with Annex I of this Agreement.
15.  The financial contribution of the United Kingdom shall only cover the parts of Horizon Europe in which it can participate. 
 Joint EU-UK R&I Committee
16.  The Joint EU-United Kingdom Research and Innovation Committee composed of the representatives of the European 
Union and the United Kingdom is hereby established. The Committee’s functions shall include the following: 
 (a)  To ensure, evaluate and review the implementation of this Agreement.
 (b)  To ensure and facilitate the timely and continuous provision of information concerning the implementation of 
activities under the Horizon Europe Programme.
 (c)  To discuss the future orientations and strategic priorities of the Programme, and policies to support the European 
Research Area. 
17.  The Committee shall meet upon the request of one of the Parties. The Committee will work on an ongoing basis through 
the exchange of documents, emails and other means of communication. The Committee shall adopt its rules of 
procedure.
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Cooperation on Research and Innovation
18.  The Parties commit to establishing favourable immigration arrangements to ensure the good functioning of the European 
Research Area. The Parties will ensure the reciprocal right of movement and residence of individuals participating in the 
activities covered by this Agreement, along with their direct family members. Direct family members of those individuals 
will be granted the right to work. 
19.  While preserving regulatory autonomy, the Parties will put in place provisions to promote regulatory approaches that are 
transparent, efficient, promote avoidance of unnecessary barriers to scientific collaboration and are compatible to the 
extent possible.
20.  A dedicated data protection arrangement will be put in place to ensure both Parties maintain equivalent levels of 
protection of personal data during activities carried out under this agreement. The agreement will provide a framework for 
registered organisations in the United Kingdom to benefit from an adequacy determination by the European Commission. 
It will ensure the safe flow of personal data between those registered organisations and the European Union, without 
being subject to any further safeguards or authorisations. Adequacy determinations will be regularly monitored by the 
Commission. This provision will become redundant should an overarching adequacy decision covering the United 
Kingdom be adopted.
21.  Provisions to meet Articles 18, 19 and 20 of this agreement must be implemented by both Parties within one year of this 
agreement entering into force. Failure to do so will see this agreement void. This deadline can be extended with the 
written consent of both Parties. The implementation of these provisions will be monitored by the Joint Committee 
established in Article 16.
Final Provisions
22.  This Agreement is hereby concluded for the duration of Horizon Europe. It shall enter into force on the date on which 
both Parties have notified each other of the completion of their procedures for that purpose. [It shall be provisionally 
applied as of [date to be agreed]].
23.  The United Kingdom’s participation in the subsequent multi-annual research programme of the Union may be subject to 
a new Agreement to be agreed between the Parties.
24.  If this Agreement is terminated or ceases to apply: 
 (a)  For the year during which the Agreement ceases to apply, the United Kingdom shall pay the financial contribution 
proportional to the number of months of its participation in the Programme during that year. For the purpose of 
calculating such a contribution, the month that has commenced at the time of receipt of the notification pursuant to 
the notice of termination or when the Agreement ceases to apply if the wider agreement is terminated shall be 
counted as a full month. 
 (b)  The Union shall reimburse to the United Kingdom the part of its contribution, already paid to the general budget of 
the European Union, that will not be spent because of the termination and/or cessation of application of this 
Agreement.
Audit, recovery and enforcement
25.  The grant agreements and/or contracts concluded with participants in the Programme established in the United Kingdom 
shall provide for scientific, financial, technological or other audits to be conducted at any time on the premises of the 
participants and of their subcontractors by Commission agents or by other persons mandated by the Commission.
26.  Recovery and enforcement decisions taken by the Commission under the Programmes covered by this Agreement which 
impose a pecuniary obligation on persons other than states shall be enforceable in the UK. If so requested by the 
Commission, the authority designated by the UK shall commence proceedings for the enforcement of the decision on 
behalf of the Commission. In this case, the decision of the Commission shall be submitted to the UK court, without other 
formality than verification of the authenticity of the decision, by the authority designated for this purpose by the UK, 
which shall inform the Commission thereof. Enforcement shall take place in accordance with the UK law and rules of 
procedure. The relevant enforcement provisions shall be incorporated in the grant agreements and/or contracts with 
participants from the UK. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to review the legality of the 
decision of the Commission and suspend its enforcement. Moreover, the courts of the UK shall have jurisdiction over 
complaints that enforcement is being carried out in an irregular manner. 
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Annex 1 – financial contribution
Calculation of the United Kingdom’s financial contribution
27.  The financial contribution of the United Kingdom to the Programme shall be established on a yearly basis in addition to 
the amount available each year in the general budget of the European Union. The United Kingdom’s contribution shall be 
obtained using a rolling average of its receipts committed under the Programme and its predecessor, Horizon 2020. The 
average will be calculated over the previous three years in which the United Kingdom was an active participant in the 
Programme or its predecessor.
28.  Where figures from the predecessor programme are used in calculating the three-year rolling average referred to in Article 
27, these will be scaled to reflect the budget for Horizon Europe. Active participation shall be understood to mean 
participating as a Member State or an Associated Country.
29.  An appropriate figure to cover Programme functioning costs will be added to the UK’s annual contribution. This figure will 
be based on the most recent and accurate data available to the European Commission. 
30.  The Commission shall communicate to the United Kingdom, as soon as possible, and at the latest on 1 September of the 
year before each financial year, the following information together with relevant background material:
 •   the amounts in commitment appropriations, in the statement of expenditure of the draft budget of the European Union 
corresponding to the Programme; 
 •   the estimated amount of the contributions derived from the draft budget, corresponding to the participation of the 
United Kingdom in the Programme according to Articles 27, 28, 29. 
31.  Once the general budget has been finally adopted, the Commission shall communicate to the United Kingdom, in the statement 
of expenditure corresponding to the United Kingdom’s participation, the final amounts referred to in the first subparagraph.
32.  A correction mechanism will apply to financial contributions, designed to protect all parties to this agreement, as 
specified in [regulation to establish Horizon Europe]. The financial contribution of the United Kingdom will be adjusted to 
reflect significant imbalances in its receipts over the life span of the Programme. The Parties will review the balance of 
committed receipts at the mid-term evaluation of the Programme and any adjustment will be indicated in the subsequent 
statement of appropriations for the Programme.
Payment of the United Kingdom’s financial contribution
33.  The Commission shall issue, at the latest in January and June of each financial year, a call for funds to the United Kingdom 
corresponding to its contribution under this Agreement. These calls for funds shall provide, respectively, for the payment of 
six-twelfths of the United Kingdom’s contribution not later than 90 days after receipt of the calls for funds. However, the 
six-twelfths to be paid not later than 90 days after receipt of the call issued in January shall be calculated on the basis of the 
amount set out in the statement of revenue of the draft budget: the regularisation of the amount thus paid shall occur with 
the payment of the six-twelfths not later than 90 days after receipt of the call for funds issued at the latest in June. 
34.  For the first year of implementation of this Agreement, the Commission shall issue a first call for funds within 30 days of its entry 
into force. Should this call be issued after 15 June, it shall provide for the payment of twelve-twelfths of the United Kingdom’s 
contribution within 90 days, calculated on the basis of the amount set out in the statement of revenue of the budget.
35.  The contribution of the United Kingdom shall be expressed and paid in EUR. Payment by the United Kingdom shall be 
credited to the Union programmes as budgetary revenue allocated to the appropriate budget heading in the statement of 
revenue of the general budget of the European Union. Regulation (2018/1046), hereinafter referred to as the ‘Financial 
Regulation’ applicable to the general budget of the European Union, shall apply to the management of the appropriations.
36.  The United Kingdom shall pay its contribution under this Agreement according to the schedule in Articles 33 and 34. Any 
delay in the payment of the contribution shall give rise to the payment of default interest by the United Kingdom on the 
outstanding amount from the due date. The interest rate shall be the rate applied by the European Central Bank to its 
main refinancing operations in EUR on the due date, increased by 1.5 percentage points.
37.  At the latest on 30 June of the year following a financial year, the statement of appropriations for the Programme of that 
financial year shall be prepared and transmitted to the United Kingdom for information, according to the format of the 
Commission’s revenue and expenditure account.
38.  The Commission, at the time of the closure of the accounts relating to each financial year, within the framework of the 
establishment of the revenue and expenditure account, shall proceed to the regularisation of the accounts with respect to 
the participation of the UK. This regularisation shall take into consideration modifications which have taken place, either 
by transfer, cancellations, carryovers, de-commitments, or by supplementary and amending budgets during the financial 
year. This regularisation shall occur at the time of the second payment for the next financial year, and for the last financial 
year in July 2021. Further regularisation shall occur every year until July 2023.
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Michael Leigh – Project Facilitator
Sir Michael Leigh is Academic Director, European Public 
Policy at The Johns Hopkins University, SAIS Europe, and 
is a Senior Adjunct Professor of European and Eurasian 
Studies. He was a senior fellow at the German Marshall 
Fund (GMF) of the United States focusing on European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, 
and the Middle East, and the future of the EU. He ran a 
programme at GMF on the implications of gas discoveries 
in the Eastern Mediterranean.
In 2006, he became Director-General for Enlargement of  
the European Commission after serving for three years  
as Deputy Director-General for External Relations with 
responsibility for European Neighbourhood Policy, relations 
with Eastern Europe, Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, 
Middle East, and the Mediterranean countries. He began 
his current role after more than 30 years in EU institutions, 
including as a cabinet member for various commissioners 
and as director in the Task Force for the EU Accession 
Negotiations. He began his career as an assistant professor 
of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and 
lecturer in international relations at the University of Sussex. 
He holds a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy, Politics, and 
Economics from Oxford University and a PhD in political 
science from MIT.
European Union team
Reinhilde Veugelers – Chair of the EU Negotiating Team
Professor Dr Reinhilde Veugelers is a full professor at KU 
Leuven (BE) in the Department of Management, Strategy 
and Innovation. She has been a senior fellow at Bruegel 
since 2009. She is also a CEPR Research Fellow and a 
member of the Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for 
Sciences. From 2004–2008, she was on academic leave  
as adviser at the European Commission (BEPA, Bureau of 
European Policy Analysis). She was the President-Elect of 
EARIE (European Association for Research in Industrial 
Economics). She currently serves on the ERC Scientific 
Council. She is a member of the Research, Innovation,  
and Science Policy Experts (RISE) high-level group advising 
Commissioner Carlos Moedas.
She was a visiting scholar at Northwestern University’s 
Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Sloan School of 
Management, MIT, Stern Business School, NYU (US), UCL 
(BE), ECARES/ULBrussels, (BE) Paris I (FR), GSE-Barcelona 
(ES), UMaastricht (NL).
Alessandro Damiani
Alessandro Damiani is President of APRE, the Italian 
Agency for the Promotion of European Research. Before 
assuming the presidency of APRE, Alessandro was working 
for 5 years in the Italian steel industry and for 35 years in 
the European institutions, first the Council of Ministers, then 
the European Commission. Throughout his time in the EC 
he dealt with R&D matters, notably research policy design, 
priority setting, the decision-making process, programme 
management, and international relations.
On secondment from the Commission to the Italian Ministry 
of Research in the early 90s, Alessandro was the founder 
and first director of APRE. From 1994 to 1998 he was 
responsible for coordinating the first transport research 
programme in DG Transport. From 1998 to 2002 he was  
the Head of the Framework Programme Unit in DG 
Research. From 2002 to 2006 he was the Head of the 
Science/Technology/Education section at the EU 
Delegation in Washington DC. From 2006 to 2010 he  
was responsible for the ‘international dimension of the  
FP’ in DG Research. From 2011 until his retirement from  
the Commission in 2016 he was in charge of Transport 
Research Strategy in DG Research and Innovation.
Alessandro graduated with a laurea in Political Sciences 
from the University of Genoa in 1975.
Participants and biographies
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Marga Gual Soler
Dr. Marga Gual Soler is an expert, speaker, advisor and 
educator in science diplomacy. She leverages the universal 
language of science to build bridges between peoples and 
nations and address cross-border challenges no country, 
institution or discipline can tackle alone. 
As Senior Project Director at the Center for Science 
Diplomacy of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS), she developed and 
implemented global science diplomacy capacity building 
initiatives to help scientists, policymakers and diplomats 
work closer together and supported the science diplomacy 
strategies of several Latin American countries. She was 
instrumental in helping re-establish the scientific linkages 
between the United States and Cuba after the normalization 
of diplomatic relations in 2015. Since 2016 she serves on 
the Research, Innovation, and Science Experts Group 
(RISE) directly advising European Commissioner Carlos 
Moedas on the EU science diplomacy strategy and 
supports the EU Horizon 2020 Science Diplomacy Cluster. 
Previously she was a science diplomacy professor at 
Arizona State University and a Global Competitiveness 
Leadership fellow at Georgetown University. In 2019  
she launched her consultancy firm SciDip GLOBAL to  
help governments, universities, NGOs and multilateral 
organizations strengthen their science-policy interfaces. 
She has received many awards and recognitions, including 
“100 Spanish experts in innovation” by Fundación Cotec, 
“40 Under 40 Latinos in Foreign Policy” by The Huffington 
Post, and in 2019 she was selected for the largest-ever 
all-women expedition to Antarctica to promote women’s 
leadership in science diplomacy and climate action. 
Debarati Guha
Debarati Guha-Sapir is the Director of CRED and a 
professor at the University of Leuven School of Public 
Health, in Brussels, Belgium. She holds an adjunct 
professorship at Tulane University Medical Centre  
(New Orleans) for Health and Humanitarian Aid.  
Trained at Calcutta University, Johns Hopkins University 
and the University of Leuven, she holds a PhD in 
epidemiology. Since 1984, she has been involved in field 
research and training in emergency and humanitarian aid 
issues, working closely with the World Health Organisation, 
UNHCR, UNDP and the European Commission in various 
regions of the world including China, Sudan, Mozambique, 
Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Great Lakes,  
Somalia and Central America. She is particularly interested 
in health systems research, epidemiology in unstable 
situations and international policy related to relief and 
post-conflict transition.
Mark Hallerberg
Mark Hallerberg has been a Non-Resident Fellow at Bruegel 
since September 2013. He is Dean for Research and 
Faculty at the Hertie School of Governance and signs off  
on all projects financed by the European Union. He is also 
principal investigator both for the DFG-funded Excellence 
Cluster and Graduiertenkolleg, and Hertie lead on CIVICA, 
project funded by the European Commission that brings 
together seven universities including LSE. He has published 
over 25 articles and book chapters on fiscal governance, 
tax competition, and exchange rate choice.
He has previously held professorships at Emory University,  
the University of Pittsburgh, and the Georgia Institute of 
Technology. He has undertaken consulting work for the Dutch 
and German Ministries of Finance, Ernst and Young Poland, 
the European Central Bank, the German Development 
Corporation (GIZ), the Inter-American Development Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.
Martin Mueller
Dr Martin Mueller is Executive Director of the Academic 
Forum at the Geneva Science and Diplomacy Anticipator. 
Prior to being Executive Director, he was Head of Office at 
SwissCore. He additionally served as a coordinator for two 
years on the Horizon 2020 project InRoad. Martin was Chair 
of the Horizon Europe Working Group of Science Europe 
from June 2017 to October 2018 and was Chair of the 
Horizon 2020 working group of Science Europe from April 
2015 to April 2017. Martin received his doctorate of science 
in biomedical engineering at ETH Zürich and his master of 
science in communication systems at Ecole Polytechnique 
Fédérale de Lausanne. 
Karin Sipido
Karin Sipido is Professor of Medicine and Head of 
Experimental Cardiology at the Department of 
Cardiovascular Sciences at KU Leuven. She holds an  
MD/PhD degree from the universities of Antwerp and 
Leuven, did postdoctoral research at the University of 
Maryland and at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore.  
She was visiting professor at the University of Maastricht, 
NL, and UMC Utrecht, NL. Her research field is rhythm 
disturbances and heart failure, identifying cellular and 
molecular mechanisms. She is elected member of the 
Academia Europaea, Fellow of the European Society of 
Cardiology, Fellow of the American Heart Association  
and of the International Society for Heart Research.
She has been chair of the KU Leuven Research Council and 
Research Coordinator on the board of the group Biomedical 
Sciences. At KU Leuven, she is presently chair of the 
Council for Research Policy. She has served on the board 
of the European Society of Cardiology where she was also 
chair of the Council Basic Cardiovascular Sciences and 
member of the EU affairs committee. She was founding 
board member and President of the Alliance for Biomedical 
Research Europe 2013-2015. Currently she chairs the 
Scientific Panel for Health under the provision of the 
European Commission Horizon 2020 program.
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Luc Soete
Professor Dr Luc Soete is Rector Magnificus and professor 
of International Economic Relations at the School  
of Business and Economics, Maastricht University.  
He obtained an economics degree from Ghent University 
and a PhD in economics from the University of Sussex.  
He then embarked on a research career in Britain and the 
United States, producing new economic insights on the 
Schumpeterian dynamics of innovation. In 1986 he was 
appointed Professor of International Economic Relations  
at the Maastricht. Two years later he established the 
Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and 
Technology (MERIT), which quickly grew into a leading 
research institute in the economic analysis of technological 
development and innovation and became part of United 
Nations University (UNU) in 2005. He was appointed Dean 
of the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG) 
in 2010.
Professor Dr Soete is also a member of the Royal 
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) and 
the Dutch Advisory Council for Science and Technology 
Policy (AWT)
Annika Thies
Annika Thies has been working as a lawyer both for the 
German Aerospace Centre (DLR) and for the European 
Commission in DG RTD. She is now Director of the 
Helmholtz Association’s Brussels office. She is in charge  
of European research policy and European research 
infrastructure strategy. Additionally, Annika is one of the 
coordinators of the DESCA model-consortium initiative.
Jan Truszczyński
Jan Truszczyński is the former Director-General of 
Education and Culture for the European Commission.  
He was appointed in 2009 and managed a budget that 
amounted to €1,406 million. He joined the European 
Commission in January 2007, when he was appointed 
Deputy Director-General for Enlargement, with responsibility 
for enlargement strategy and communication. From 2001  
to 2005 Mr Truszczyński was first Undersecretary of State, 
then Secretary of State in the Polish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. In this capacity, he was Poland’s chief negotiator 
during its EU accession negotiations. Prior to that, Mr 
Truszczyński was Ambassador of Poland to the EU in 
Brussels from 1996 to 2001.
In 2005 he was awarded the Order of the Knight of the 
Legion of Honour for activities for the European Union and 
the development of Franco-Polish relations. In the same 
year, he was awarded the Commander’s Cross of the Order 
of Polonia Restituta by President Aleksander Kwasniewski.
He graduated in 1972 from the Foreign Trade Department  
of the Main School of Planning and Statistics, obtaining a 
professional degree in economics, specialising in European 
integration. He then completed postgraduate studies in 
German Studies (1975) and public international law (1985).
United Kingdom team
Beth Thompson – Chair of the UK Negotiating Team
Dr Beth Thompson is Head of UK and EU Policy at the 
Wellcome Trust. Wellcome is a global foundation that exists 
to improve health for everyone by helping great ideas to 
thrive. It spends around £1 billion a year to support 
research, innovation and public engagement. Beth leads 
Wellcome’s UK and EU policy and advocacy activities, 
covering issues including Brexit, research investment and 
emerging technology.
In 2017 Beth was awarded an MBE for services to science 
for successfully advocating against amendments to the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation that would have been 
severely damaging for research. Beth holds a PhD from the 
Medical Research Council Laboratory of Molecular Biology 
in Cambridge and a degree in Natural Sciences 
(Biochemistry) from the University of Cambridge.
Eilis Ferran
Eilís Ferran is Professor of Company & Securities Law at the 
University of Cambridge, a University JM Keynes Fellow in 
Financial Economics, and a Fellow of The British Academy. 
She did her undergraduate studies in Law at Cambridge 
University and also completed her doctorate there on the 
topic of mortgage securitization. She qualified as a Solicitor 
with Coward (now Clifford) Chance. She is a Professorial 
Fellow of St Catharine’s College, Cambridge. She has 
written extensively on UK, EU and international financial 
regulation, company law and corporate finance law.  
Her recent publications include contributions to Ferran, 
Moloney, Hill and Coffee, The Regulatory Aftermath of the 
Global Financial Crisis (CUP 2012) and Ferrarini, Hopt and 
Wymeersch (ed), Rethinking Financial Regulation and 
Supervision in Times of Crisis (OUP, 2012. The new edition 
of her textbook Principles of Corporate Finance Law (OUP) 
was published in 2014. She has advised and given 
evidence to Parliamentary committees and other bodies, 
including serving as the Specialist Adviser to the UK 
Parliament House of Lords European Union Committee 
(Sub Committee A) in its inquiry into banking union 
(September – December 2012). She has been a visiting 
scholar at law schools in the United States, New Zealand 
and Hong Kong, and speaks regularly at conferences in 
Europe and beyond. She is the founding editor of the 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies (Hart Publishing) and 
serves on numerous advisory boards and committees, 
including the Cambridge Endowment for Research in 
Finance, the Board of Advisors to the Yale Program on 
Financial Stability and the Academic Advisory Board of  
the Asian Institute of International Financial Law. She is  
a member of the European Company Law Experts Group 
(ECLE) and a former member of the European Banking 
Authority’s Stakeholder Group.  She is a non-executive 
director of Euroclear SA/NV. Since 2015 she has served  
as University of Cambridge Pro-Vice- Chancellor for 
Institutional and Interational Relations.
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Clare Moody
Clare Moody was elected as the Member of the European 
Parliament for the South West and Gibraltar in May 2014. 
Clare was Vice-Chair of the European Parliament Security 
and Defence Committee, and a member of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Women’s Rights Committee, and 
Industry, Research and Energy Committee. Before her 
election, Clare spent most of her working life as a trade 
unionist representing people in a wide variety of industries. 
She also spent two years working in Downing Street for 
Gordon Brown when he was Prime Minister, from 2008–
2010. She left office in 2019.
Andrew Scott
Andrew Scott is Professor of European Union Studies at  
the University of Edinburgh Law School. He is a co-director 
(with Professor Jo Shaw) of the Europa Institute.
He is an economist by training and has for many years 
researched and taught European economic integration.  
He has published widely in the topic of European economic 
integration, most recently on subsidiarity, economic and 
monetary union and economic and social cohesion. He has 
acted as expert to various EC agencies, including the 
European Commission and Eurostat, the statistical office  
of the EU. Prior to joining the University of Edinburgh, Drew 
Scott was a lecturer in economics at Heriot-Watt University. 
His current research includes the impact of devolution  
on the UK’s European policy process, and problems of 
economic policy coordination in a devolved UK. From 
1991–98 Drew was a joint editor of the Journal of Common 
Market Studies.
Uta Staiger
Uta Staiger is the co-founder and Executive Director  
of the UCL European Institute. Since 2010, she has led  
the Institute in its mission to both create and curate 
opportunities for research on Europe within and beyond 
UCL. In consultation with the Institute’s Academic Director, 
currently Professor Piet Eeckhout (UCL Laws), Uta leads on 
the strategic development of the Institute and designs and 
oversees its portfolio of activities. She also helps drive 
UCL’s policy engagement on EU and European matters, 
including relationships with key stakeholders.
In June 2017, Uta was appointed as UCL’s Pro-Vice-
Provost (Europe), a strategic role shaping UCL’s 
engagement with Europe, and acting as ambassador and 
advocate for UCL’s work on the continent. In this role she 
contributes to UCL’s institutional strategy on Brexit while 
also co-convening the university’s steering group on the 
research-based response to Brexit.
Janet Thornton
Professor Dame Janet Thornton was Director of EMBL-EBI 
from October 2001 to June 2015, and played a key role  
in ELIXIR, the pan-European infrastructure for biological 
data, since its inception. Her research group focuses on 
understanding protein structure (function and evolution) and 
ageing using computational approaches. After a physics 
degree she completed her PhD at the UK NIMR before 
post-doctoral studies at Oxford. She then held a joint 
appointment at University College London and the Bernal 
Chair in the Crystallography Department at Birkbeck 
College. Professor Thornton is a Fellow of the Royal 
Society, a Fellow of the Academy of Medical Sciences,  
a member of EMBO and a foreign associate of the US 
National Academy of Sciences.
Paolo Vineis
Professor Paolo Vineis is Chair of Environmental 
Epidemiology at Imperial College, London, and he leads  
the Exposome and Health theme of the MRC-PHE Centre 
for Environment and Health at Imperial College.
Professor Vineis has extensive experience in leading 
international projects. He has coordinated the European 
Commission funded EXPOsOMICS project (valued at 
€8.7m, between 2012–2017). He is currently coordinating 
the Horizon 2020-funded project LIFEPATH (valued at  
€6 million, started in 2015). He is a principal investigator/
co-investigator of numerous international research projects, 
such as the European Commission funded GENAIR, 
ECNIS2, Envirogenomarkers, Hypergenes, ESCAPE and 
Transphorm networks, in which he has led Work Packages. 
In addition, he has attracted grants from the Leverhulme 
Trust, MRC, Cancer Research UK, HuGeF Foundation and 
the US National Cancer Institute. He is also the Director  
of the Unit of Molecular and Genetic Epidemiology, Italian 
Institute of Genomic Medicine (IIGM, formerly known as 
Human Genetics Foundation – HuGeF), Torino, Italy.
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European Research Area (ERA) 
– a unified research area committed to the free circulation 
of researchers, scientific knowledge and technology.
Framework Programme 
– the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation 
is the EU’s multiyear science and research funding 
programme. 
Horizon Europe 
– The EU’s Eighth Framework Programme for Research and 
Innovation, running from 2021–2027.
Horizon 2020 
– The EU’s Seventh Framework Programme for Research 
and Innovation, running from 2014–2020.
Association agreement 
– an association agreement is a legally binding bilateral 
agreement between the EU and a non-EU country. 
Association agreement normally refers to the broad 
agreement setting out economic and political cooperation 
in areas of mutual interest. This should not be confused 
with Framework Programme association agreements which 
specifically set out the terms for association to the EU’s 
Framework Programme for Research and Innovation.
Glossary
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